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THE FAILURE OF ORIGINALISM IN PRESERVING
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO CIVIL JURY TRIAL
Renée Lettow Lerner*

ABSTRACT
The Federal Bill of Rights and state constitutions rely heavily on procedural
protections, especially jury rights. Supporters of these rights at the founding praised
the jury in extravagant terms, and many members of the legal profession continue
to do so today. Yet civil and criminal jury trials are vanishing in the United States.
The disappearance of the civil jury presents a puzzle because the Seventh Amendment and state constitutional rights require that civil jury trial be “preserved” or
“remain inviolate.”
Scholarship on the history of constitutional rights to civil jury trial has tended to
focus exclusively on the Seventh Amendment, particularly at the time of the founding
or during the modern era. This Article examines both state and federal courts’ interpretations of constitutional rights from the late eighteenth through the early twentieth
century. It demonstrates that courts during that time adopted originalist tests. These
tests, however, proved so flexible that they allowed legislatures and courts great
discretion in modifying civil jury trial. The civil jury was no longer valued as a lawnullifying institution, as it had been at the founding, but instead was considered a
hindrance to the administration of justice. Courts were concerned to accommodate
changed circumstances, such as growing docket pressure and expense of litigation
and emphasized the impossibility of maintaining every detail of original practice.
Once the anchor of original jury practice was abandoned, the jury right seemed
tethered to no definite meaning. The one exception was the jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court under the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, but
even that strict historical test proved able to be circumvented. This history suggests
problems with maintaining procedural rights more generally.
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The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.1
Jury trials constituted 0.6% of all state court civil dispositions in
2002.2
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution3—and nearly every state constitution4—guarantees the right
to civil jury trial. The right to civil jury trial has been historically, and continues to
1

CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. XXI; ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 28; MO. CONST. of 1820,
art. XIII, § 8; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 6; R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 15; ILL. CONST.
of 1848, art. XIII, § 6; IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 9; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 4; NEB.
CONST. of 1875, art. I, § 6; see also N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI (“[T]rial by jury, in all cases
in which it hath heretofore been used in the colony of New York, shall be established and
remain inviolate forever.”); CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 3 (“The right of trial by jury shall
be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever . . . .”); MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 23
(“The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate . . . .”). Throughout
this Article, sources are often listed in chronological order, to emphasize historical sequence.
2
See Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976–2002, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 768 (2004).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
4
The exceptions are Louisiana and Colorado. Louisiana’s original Constitution of 1812
did not include a right to civil jury trial, although it did include a right to criminal jury trial.
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be today, praised in extravagant terms. Several state constitutions called the right
“sacred.”5 Lawyers and judges hailed the right as the “palladium of our rights”6 and
“the most distinguishing badge of liberty,”7 among many other eulogiums. In a law
review symposium in 2013, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island called the
civil jury “a bastion of individual rights” and “a structural element of our system of
government.”8 And yet, this lavish praise has coexisted with elaborate efforts to curtail
the power of the jury.9 Much-lauded in the rhetoric of the legal profession, the civil
jury has been much derided in practice. Today, in both the federal and state courts,
civil jury trials are vanishingly rare.10
How did we get here? The framers of the state and federal constitutions made
every effort to prevent this outcome.11 Nearly all the constitutional guarantees of civil
jury trial refer to a historical baseline, either expressly or impliedly. Many of the provisions declare that jury trial shall “remain inviolate.”12 The texts seem to demand a
method of interpretation that today we would call originalist. As this Article demonstrates, originalism has indeed been the method most state courts have used to interpret these provisions, from the time they were ratified.13 The historical test used by
the U.S. Supreme Court to interpret the Seventh Amendment is part of this trend.
Under this test, the Court has declared that the Seventh Amendment preserves the
practice of trial by jury as it existed at common law in England in 1791, the date of the
Amendment’s ratification.14 Nevertheless, even an originalist method of interpretation
has failed to protect the jury right in a form that would be recognizable to the original
supporters of these provisions. This Article shows what happened and suggests why
the aspiration to enshrine procedural rights in a constitution is ultimately quixotic.
See LA. CONST. of 1812, art. VI, § 18. Subsequent versions of the Louisiana Constitution
maintained this distinction, as does the current Constitution. See LA. CONST. of 1845, art. CVII;
LA. CONST. of 1852, art. CIII; LA. CONST. of 1864, art. CV; LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. 1, art. 6;
LA. CONST. of 1879, art. VII; LA. CONST. of 1974, art. I, §§ 16 & 17 (as amended). On
Colorado, see infra note 62 and accompanying text.
5
See, e.g., VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 11; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV;
MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XV; N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. XX.
6
Beers v. Beers, 4 Conn. 535, 539 (1823).
7
Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 604 (1831).
8
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Opening Remarks at the William & Mary Law Review
Symposium: The Civil Jury as a Political Institution (Feb. 22, 2013), available at http://www
.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/speeches/william-and-mary-law-review-symposium-the-civil
-jury-as-a-political-institution.
9
See infra Part II.
10
See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012) [hereinafter Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial] (citing
statistics showing that in 2002, 1.2% of federal civil filings terminated in jury trials, and jury
trials constituted 0.6% of all state court dispositions).
11
See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text.
12
See infra notes 53–54 and accompanying text; infra Part I.A.
13
See infra Part II.B.
14
See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s originalist interpretation of the Seventh Amendment
has prompted many questions. Should the jury practices of England in 1791 be followed in every detail? Could they be? Professor Suja Thomas, for example, has advocated a strict application of the historical test under the Seventh Amendment.15 She
has argued, for instance, that no method of jury control should be used today that was
unknown to the common law of England in 1791.16 (Certain recent U.S. Supreme Court
cases concerning the criminal jury, and other features of criminal procedure, have
suggested a similar position, strictly applying an originalist interpretation.17 ) Other
scholars have pointed out some of the difficulties with that method of interpretation.18
The difficulties go deep, indeed. As this Article demonstrates, a strict originalist test
would preclude many forms of court reorganization, changes to juror eligibility and
selection, jury fees and waiver provisions, methods of bringing the trial record to an
appellate court on appeal, and many other modifications to the civil justice system.
15

Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139,
144–45 (2007) [hereinafter Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional].
16
Id. at 174–77; Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur
Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 754 (2003); Suja A. Thomas, The
Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
687, 695–704 (2004) [hereinafter Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and
the English Common Law].
17
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238–39 (2005); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301–02, 313–14 (2004); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
53–54 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477–83, 490 (2000); United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512–14 (1995).
18
See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Originalism and Summary Judgment, 71 OHIO ST. L.J.
919, 925, 928–30 (2010) (arguing that not every change to jury practice rises to the level of
constitutional significance and observing that many changes have occurred in federal practice
that have expanded the types of cases juries can decide, including changes in pleading rules,
ability to bring class actions, and judicial acceptance of contingency fees); Darrell A.H. Miller,
Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second,
122 YALE L.J. 852, 877–84 (2013) (chronicling the U.S. Supreme Court’s flexible interpretation of the Seventh Amendment). Fitzpatrick left off his list one of the most important
changes expanding jury power, which is the curtailment of the judicial power to comment on
evidence. See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The
Silent Judge, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195, 241–57 (2000) [hereinafter Lerner, The Silent
Judge]. Concerning the effort to apply a strict originalist test to the criminal jury, see Joan L.
Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism’s Uneasy Relationship with the Jury,
71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 961–62 (2010) (observing that, in the late eighteenth century, juries
consisted of twelve propertied men, almost always white, who generally had the right as well
as the power to find law, had to decide unanimously and could be kept without food, fire, or
drink until a verdict was reached). For an analysis of difficulties in applying a strict originalist
test under the Confrontation Clause in a domestic violence case in which a witness was unavailable to testify at trial because the defendant had killed her, see Brief for the Domestic
Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project (DV LEAP) et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 20–28, Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (No. 07-6053).
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This Article shows that state and federal courts almost uniformly rejected such an
interpretation from the time the constitutions were ratified. One of the few exceptions
was the federal courts’ interpretation of the Seventh Amendment’s Re-examination
Clause, and even that proved able to be evaded by procedural mechanisms.19 This
Article also shows that it has proved difficult for courts to settle on a standard or test
for constitutional civil jury rights. Once the anchor of original practice is abandoned,
as courts have all held it must be, the jury right seems tethered to no definite meaning.
As this Article discusses, the normal methods of interpreting constitutional provisions
to account for changed circumstances do not work for jury rights. Courts therefore
have permitted legislatures to alter the jury right until it has become unrecognizable.
A potential problem in applying an originalist test is that it can be difficult to determine what the original practice or law was concerning a particular question. This
was seldom a problem in cases involving jury rights, however. Judges often knew—
and described minutely in their opinions—exactly what the laws or practices were at
the time a constitution was ratified. This detailed knowledge of original practice included questions about jury selection, the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, jury
fees, and nonsuit, directed verdict and other methods of jury control.20 This level of
knowledge is hardly surprising. In many cases, the judges were describing practices
and laws that had pertained only a few decades previously, sometimes less. Despite this
clear knowledge of original practice, judges did not hesitate to declare that the legislature could alter the law.21 Even though a significant difficulty of originalism did not
apply, the method still proved unworkable respecting the right to civil jury trial.
This Article focuses as much on state constitutional provisions and decisions as
on the Seventh Amendment and the decisions of federal courts. Most scholarly writing concerning the history of civil jury trial rights focuses exclusively on the Seventh
Amendment. Almost none concerns the state rights.22 Even historical scholarship on
the Seventh Amendment tends to address the time of the founding,23 rarely the later
19

See infra Part III.
See, e.g., Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 416 (Pa. 1808); Keddie v. Moore, 6 N.C. (2
Mur.) 41, 45 (1811); United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 746–50 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)
(No. 16,750); Head v. Hughes, 8 Ky. (1 A.K. Marsh) 372, 373 (1818); Beers v. Beers, 4
Conn. 535, 536 (1823); Curtis v. Gill, 34 Conn. 49, 55 (1867).
21
See infra Part II.B.2.
22
The few works addressing the history of state constitutional rights to jury trial focus
on particular states. See, e.g., Bruce D. Greenberg & Gary K. Wolinetz, The Right to a Civil
Jury Trial in New Jersey, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1461 (1995).
23
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
81–92 (1998); Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87
IOWA L. REV. 145 (2001); Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of the Seventh
Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407 (1999); Charles W. Wolfram, The
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973); Edith Guild
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966).
20
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history until the modern era.24 Yet the history of these provisions did not stop with
their ratification. The subsequent history of constitutional rights to civil jury trial reveals a steady decline in the importance of civil juries. That this happened in all jurisdictions, state and federal, suggests the difficulty of using originalist interpretations
to preserve rights to civil jury trial.
This Article begins by describing, in Part I, the various constitutional rights to
civil jury trial and the motivations behind them. At the time of the founding, the civil
jury was regarded primarily as a political institution, not a judicial one. Supporters
of state and federal constitutional rights praised the civil jury in extravagant terms,
and valued the institution mainly for its ability to nullify unpopular laws—especially
laws requiring repayment of debts. This use of procedural rights as a substitute for
substantive protections is a longstanding theme in the history of the common law.
After the founding era, however, the civil jury’s role as a political institution receded from view, and it received more attention as a judicial institution. In that respect,
many courts and legal commentators believed, the civil jury fell short. State constitutional conventions modified rights to civil jury trial to permit waiver and other forms
of flexibility. Part II examines prominent themes in interpretations of rights to civil
jury trial from the founding through the early twentieth century. Courts continued to
praise the civil jury, but they increasingly distinguished between civil and criminal
juries in practice. Faced with the language of preservation in constitutional jury rights,
courts adopted originalist tests. These tests, however, proved flexible and permitted
many innovations in civil jury practice. Judicial opinions described at length the drawbacks of an alternative—a strict originalist test. Courts allowed legislatures considerable
discretion. Indeed, there are few cases in which a court held that a statute violated a
constitutional right to civil jury trial.
Part II.C explores the various rationales used for allowing innovations in jury
practice.25 Courts explained that circumstances had changed since their constitutions
were ratified. In particular, judges expressed several concerns about the use of civil
juries: growing docket pressure and delays, rising expense of litigation, inconvenience
to jurors, and, in some cases, juror incompetence or bias. In addition to these arguments
about changed circumstances, opinions relied on the fiction that certain persons had
consented to non-jury proceedings by engaging in particular activities or assuming
certain positions. This fiction was especially useful in holding that litigants could be
24

Some work has addressed the later history of the Seventh Amendment, before the late
twentieth century. See Miller, supra note 18, at 872–84; Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 592–624 (2003); Ann
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 612–23 (2001).
25
The Article does not address questions about the line between law and equity. This
topic has particularly concerned judges and commentators interpreting the Preservation
Clause of the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 5–24 (2006). The complexity of this
issue, however, requires a separate article to be properly treated.
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subjected to new summary proceedings. Courts also upheld attempts by legislatures
to limit jury demands by making jury trial more expensive. Typically, litigants would
be forced into non-jury proceedings—such as those before justices of the peace or
summary proceedings—and could only get a jury on appeal, after payment of appeal
bonds and jury fees. To further reduce jury trials, courts, legislatures, and even constitutional conventions provided for waiver of civil jury trial.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, civil jury trial once again
became politically salient. Just as debt cases were an intense political issue at the
founding of the nation, personal injury cases against railroads and other industrial
corporations generated sharp political conflict in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Judges and legislatures permitted courts to assume more control over
jury verdicts, partly to prevent the inefficiency of new trials and partly to counteract
what they viewed as juror bias. Courts upheld these expanded judicial powers against
constitutional challenge. Judges relied on the old common law distinction that the
facts are for the jury and the law is for the judge, even though the line between fact
and law had shifted dramatically since the founding.
Part III examines what happened when a court tried to adhere to a strict originalist test. An exception to the almost universal use of flexible tests was the U.S.
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence applying the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh
Amendment. In the end, however, even that strict originalist test could not prevent
greater judicial control over juries. A clever procedural mechanism permitted innovation in jury practice. This kind of innovation anticipated the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure of 1938. The flexibility respecting jury procedure described in this Article
sets the stage for the changes made afterward by the Federal Rules. By emphasizing
expensive pretrial discovery that encourages settlement, the Federal Rules have continued the process of killing civil jury trial.
The Conclusion suggests that this Article presents a warning about reliance on
procedural rights. It offers some broader observations on the difficulty of maintaining procedural, as opposed to substantive, rights.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO CIVIL JURY TRIAL:
ORIGINS IN NULLIFICATION
A. State Constitutional Rights
At the founding, the jury was a political institution.26 The American colonists’ experience with civil juries in the struggle with Britain led many to value the institution
26

Tocqueville famously treated the jury mainly as a political institution, rather than as
a judicial institution. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270–76 (J.P. Mayer
ed., George Lawrence trans., 1969).
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as a means of nullifying the law.27 In the 1761 case of Erving v. Cradock,28 for example, a Massachusetts merchant sued a customs inspector for trespass and won a
large verdict from a jury. The royal governor of Massachusetts, Francis Bernard, complained to a former governor that “[a] custom house officer has no chance with a jury,
let his cause be what it will.”29 Bernard warned his superiors in London that such verdicts effectively overturned judgments of the Court of Admiralty, which sat without
juries, and nullified customs laws.30 Another colonial governor of Massachusetts wrote
that “a trial by jury here is only trying one illicit trader by his fellows, or at least by
his well-wishers.”31
Colonists viewed the jurisdiction of the juryless admiralty courts, which prevented
nullification of customs laws, as a major grievance.32 In response to the Stamp Act of
1765,33 delegates from nine of the thirteen colonies met in New York the same year,
a meeting known as the Stamp Act Congress.34 They adopted a Declaration of Rights
and Grievances, which included the provisions “[t]hat Tryal [sic] by jury is the inherent and invaluable Right of every British Subject, in these Colonies,” and that The
Stamp Act and several other Acts, “by extending the Jurisdiction of the Courts of
Admiralty, beyond its Ancient limits, have a Manifest tendency to Subvert the Rights,
and liberties of the Colonists.”35 The Declaration of Independence listed as a reason
for separation: “For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury.”36
27

Many colonists also held the criminal jury in high esteem. Colonial criminal juries nullified unpopular laws such as those against seditious libel. See, e.g., JAMES ALEXANDER, A
BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW
YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 100–01 (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 1963) (1736); JOHN H. LANGBEIN,
RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 475–80 (2009).
28
Erving v. Cradock (1761), reprinted in Governor Francis Bernard to the Lords of Trade,
6 August 1761, 2 BERNARD PAPERS 46, 47, reprinted in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF
CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE
OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 553–56 (Boston 1865) [hereinafter
BERNARD PAPERS].
29
Governor Francis Bernard to Thomas Pownall, 28 August 1761, BERNARD PAPERS,
supra note 28, at 557.
30
Governor Francis Bernard to the Lords of Trade, 6 August 1761, BERNARD PAPERS,
supra note 28, at 555 (“Your Lordships will perceive that these actions have an immediate
tendency to destroy the Court of Admiralty and with it the Custom house, which cannot subsist without that Court.”).
31
STEPHEN BOTEIN, EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 57 (1983) (quoting Governor
William Shirley).
32
See C.A. WESLAGER, THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS: WITH AN EXACT COPY OF THE
COMPLETE JOURNAL 12 (1976).
33
Stamp Act, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (U.K.).
34
WESLAGER, supra note 32, at 9, 107–08.
35
Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress (1765), reprinted in WESLAGER, supra note
32, at 201–02.
36
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
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The weakness of the colonial bench encouraged the view that juries should decide
law as well as fact.37 Colonial judges lacked independence; they were usually dependent on the royal governor, who could appoint and dismiss them at will.38 In addition,
many colonial judges were untrained in the law.39 As a result, jury instructions could
be vague or non-existent.40
The history of juries nullifying unpopular British laws, together with the weakness
of the colonial bench, led important founders of the new republic to support the power
of juries to decide the law. At various points, John Adams,41 Thomas Jefferson,42 and
even John Jay as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court43 declared that juries could
decide the law, against the direction of the court.
With this background, the new states that wrote declarations of rights or constitutions almost invariably guaranteed the right to civil jury trial.44 In June 1776, George
37

See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 27, at 479.
See id. at 478.
39
See id. at 479.
40
See id. In some colonies, particularly in New England, panels of judges presided over
jury trials. The judges charged the jury seriatim, and sometimes gave contradictory instructions.
Counsel sometimes argued law to the jury, strengthening the idea that the jury should decide
the law. Id. at 480; see William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John
Marshall’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 911–12 (1978).
41
“It is not only [a juror’s] right but his Duty . . . to find the Verdict according to his own
best Understanding, Judgment and Conscience, tho [sic] in Direct opposition to the Direction
of the Court.” John Adams, Diary Notes on the Rights of Juries, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN
ADAMS 229–30 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). For a discussion of the
circumstances under which Adams wrote about the law-finding powers of juries, see 2
DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 5 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961).
42
It is usual for the jurors to decide the fact, and to refer the law arising
on it to the decision of the judges. But this division of the subject lies
with their discretion only. And if the question relate to any point of
public liberty, or if it be one in which the judges may be suspected of
bias, the jury undertake to decide both law and fact.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 140 (J.W. Randolph ed., 1853)
(1781–82).
43
In 1794, Chief Justice Jay charged a civil jury that, although the jury usually decided
the facts and the judge the law, the jurors had “a right to take upon [them]selves to judge of
both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.” Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794). For a description of the Supreme Court’s jury procedure, see 6 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at
84 n.70 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998); Lochlan F. Shelfer, Special Juries in the Supreme Court,
123 YALE L.J. 208, 221–32 (2013). Shelfer has explained that the jury in Brailsford was a
special jury of merchants, whose purpose as experts was to help the court to determine the law
merchant. Id. at 212, 220, 227, 230–31.
44
One exception was the New Hampshire Constitution of January 5, 1776, the earliest
state constitution, which was very brief and framed in two weeks during a holiday period. See
4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
38
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Mason wrote in the Virginia Declaration of Rights: “That, in controversies respecting
property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable to
any other, and ought to be held sacred.”45 North Carolina’s formulation in December
of the same year closely followed Virginia’s, adding that trial by jury ought to remain “inviolable” as well as “sacred.”46 The Pennsylvania Constitution of the same
year simply declared: “Trials shall be by jury as heretofore.”47 Other states adopted
different formulations.48 Several states borrowed the language from the Magna Carta,
translated from Latin, concerning the “judgment of his peers” and the “law of the
land.”49 The New England states were slower to write constitutions than the others,
but these later constitutions incorporated language on jury trial from other states.50

LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2451 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). The other exception
was Delaware, whose Constitution of 1776 did not specifically mention juries but did incorporate “the common law of England.” DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XXV. The Delaware
Constitution of 1792 borrowed from Pennsylvania’s provision, see infra text accompanying
note 47, and provided that “Trial by jury shall be as heretofore.” DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I,
§ 4.
45
VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 11.
46
N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XIV (“That in all controversies at law,
respecting property, the ancient mode of trial, by jury, is one of the best securities of the rights
of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.”).
47
PA. CONST. of 1776, § 25.
48
The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 announced: “[T]he inestimable right of trial by
jury shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.” N.J.
CONST. of 1776, art. XXII. South Carolina’s Constitution of 1776 confined the jurisdiction
of the court of admiralty to maritime cases and provided for summoning juries. S.C. CONST.
of 1776, arts. XVII & XVIII. The Georgia Constitution of 1777 contained elaborate jury
procedures in civil cases, and declared: “The jury shall be judges of law, as well as of fact.”
GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XL & XLI.
49
See MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXI; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XLI (“[N]o freeman of
this State [shall] be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges,
or outlawed, exiled or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but
by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”).
50
See MASS. CONST of 1780, art. XV (“In all controversies concerning property, and in all
suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways
used and practised, the parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure
shall be held sacred, unless, in causes arising on the high seas, and such as relate to mariners’
wages, the legislature shall hereafter find it necessary to alter it.”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. I,
§ 20 (“In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons,
except in cases in which it has been heretofore otherwise used and practiced, the parties have
a right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure shall be held sacred, unless in causes
arising on the high seas, and such as relate to mariners’ wages, the legislature shall think it
necessary hereafter to alter it.”); CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 21 (“The right of trial by
Jury shall remain inviolate.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 15 (“The right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate.”).
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Sometimes constitutional provisions mentioned civil and criminal juries separately,
but more often they referred to the two together, as “trial by jury.”51 These provisions
almost always referred to the past, to preservation.52 The most widely copied of these
early formulations turned out to be that of the New York Constitution of 1777, which
declared: “[T]rial by jury, in all cases in which it hath heretofore been used in the
colony of New York, shall be established and remain inviolate forever.”53 Many states
writing later constitutions adopted the “remain inviolate” language.54
The constitutional provisions themselves, however, did not remain inviolate. Many
states made changes over time to the text of their constitutional guarantees. These
changes often made distinctions between rights to civil and criminal jury trial.55 The
vast majority of these modifications gave legislatures greater freedom to modify civil
jury trial.56 The provisions typically recited that jury trial “shall remain inviolate,”
and then added a clause or sentence beginning “but.”57 Changes included authorizing
waiver of jury trial in civil cases;58 providing that a jury could consist of fewer than
51

See, e.g., supra note 50.
See, e.g., supra note 50.
53
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI.
54
See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 3 (“Freedom of the press and trial by jury shall
remain inviolate.”); CONN. CONST of 1818, art. I, § 21 (“The right of trial by Jury shall remain inviolable.”); ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 28 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate.”); MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 8 (“That the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate.”); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 6 (“That the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate.”); FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 3 (“That the right of trial by jury shall forever remain inviolate.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. 1, § 15 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate.”); ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 6 (“That the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate; and shall extend to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in controversy.”);
CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 3 (“The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain
inviolate forever . . . .”); IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 9 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . . .”); MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 4 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate . . . .”); NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. I, § 6 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate . . . .”); MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 23 (“The right of trial by jury shall be
secured to all, and remain inviolate.”).
55
See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 2.
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
New York was one of the first states to alter its jury trial right, in 1846. Id. The New
York Constitution of that year added explicit permission for the legislature to provide for
waiver of civil jury trial: “The trial by jury, in all cases in which it has been heretofore used,
shall remain inviolate forever. But a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases,
in the manner to be prescribed by law.” Id. Many other states followed. See, e.g., CAL. CONST.
of 1849, art. I, § 3 (“The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever; but a trial by jury may be waived by the parties in all civil cases, in the manner to be
prescribed by law.”); MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 4 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy,
but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law.”);
52
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twelve;59 and permitting majority verdicts.60 Few states maintained their constitutional
ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 6 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate and shall
extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be
waived by the parties in all cases, in the manner prescribed by law.”); FLA. CONST. of 1868,
Declaration of Rights, § 6 (“The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate forever; but in all civil cases a jury trial may be waived by the parties in the manner
to be prescribed by law.”); MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 23 (“The right of trial by jury shall
be secured to all, and remain inviolate, but . . . upon default of appearance or by consent of the
parties expressed in such manner as the law may prescribe, a trial by jury may be waived, or
a trial had by any less number of jurors than the number provided by law.”).
59
Some constitutions gave the parties the ability to agree to a number of jurors fewer than
twelve, an arrangement that resembled waiver. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 7 (“In
civil actions, and cases of misdemeanor, the jury may consist of twelve, or of any number less
than twelve upon which the parties may agree in open Court.”); MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III,
§ 23 (“The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate, but . . . upon
default of appearance or by consent of the parties expressed in such manner as the law may
prescribe, a trial by jury may be waived, or a trial had by any less number of jurors than the
number provided by law.”). Other constitutions gave to the legislature the power to reduce
the number of jurors, at first only for inferior courts. See, e.g., IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. I,
§ 9 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the General Assembly may authorize
trial by a jury of a less number than twelve men in inferior courts . . . .”); ILL. CONST. of 1870,
art. II, § 5 (“The right of trial by jury, as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate; but the
trial of civil cases before justices of the peace, by a jury of less than twelve men, may be authorized by law.”); MO. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 28 (“The right of trial by jury, as heretifore
[sic] enjoyed, shall remain inviolate, but a jury for the trial of civil and criminal cases in courts
not of record may consist of less than twelve men as may be prescribed by law.”); NEB.
CONST. of 1875, art. I, § 6 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the legislature may authorize trial by a jury of a less number than twelve men, in courts inferior to the
district court . . . .”); GA. CONST. of 1877, art. VI, § 18, para. 1 (“The right of trial by jury,
except where it is otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall remain inviolate, but the
General Assembly may prescribe any number, not less than five, to constitute a trial or traverse
jury in courts other than the Superior and City Courts.”). The Constitutional Convention of
Virginia of 1850, however, anticipated and tried to counter this trend by adding a phrase to
George Mason’s words: “That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man
and man, the ancient trial by jury of twelve men is preferable to any other, and ought to be held
sacred.” VA. CONST. of 1850, Bill of Rights, art. XI (emphasis added). Virginia removed this
phrase from its constitution twenty years later, in 1870. See VA. CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 13
(“That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the trial by
jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred.”).
60
ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. II, amended by ARK. CONST. of 1874, amend. XVI, § 7
(1927), and adopted at the general election on Nov. 6, 1928 (“[I]n all jury trials in civil cases,
where as many as nine of the jurors agree upon a verdict, the verdict so agreed upon shall be
returned as the verdict of such jury, provided, however, that where a verdict is returned by less
than twelve jurors all the jurors consenting to such verdict shall sign the same.”); PA. CONST.
of 1874, art. I, § 6; NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. I, § 6 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, but the Legislature may authorize trial by a jury of a less number than twelve in
courts inferior to the District Court, and may by general law authorize a verdict in civil cases
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provisions for civil jury trial unchanged through the nineteenth century.61 The Colorado Constitutional Convention of 1876 was bolder. The Colorado Constitution of
that year pointedly refused to guarantee the right of civil jury trial at all.62 To this
day, Colorado has no constitutional right to civil jury trial.63 In debates about these
changes in the state constitutional conventions, members emphasized the cost to the
government—typically counties—of civil jury trials.64 These costs included both the
in any court by not less than five-sixths of the jury.”); CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 7 (“The
right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate; but in civil actions three
fourths of the jury may render a verdict.”); MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 23 (“In all civil
actions . . . two-thirds in number of the jury may render a verdict, and such verdict so rendered
shall have the same force and effect as if all of such jury concurred therein.”).
61
Two rare exceptions were Delaware and Alabama. See DEL. CONST. of 1897, art. I, § 4
(“Trial by jury shall be as heretofore.”); DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. I, § 4 (same); DEL. CONST.
of 1792, art. I, § 4 (same); ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. I, § 11 (“That the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate.”); ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. I, § 12 (same); ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. I,
§ 13 (same); ALA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 12 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”); ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 28 (same).
62
COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. II, § 23 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate
in criminal cases; but a jury in civil cases in all courts, or in criminal cases in courts not
of record, may consist of less than twelve men, as may be prescribed by law.”); see
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE STATE OF COLORADO
1875–1876, at 209–10 (1907) [hereinafter COLORADO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1875–1876] (recording modifications made to the right to jury trial by the Committee of the
Whole eliminating the right in civil cases and specifying that in all civil cases, a jury could
consist of fewer than twelve).
63
The jury trial provision is unchanged in the current version of the Colorado Constitution, except that “persons” has been substituted for “men.” See COLO. CONST. of 1876 (as
amended), art. II, § 23. Colorado statutes have continuously provided for civil juries. See
DALE A. OESTERLE & RICHARD B. COLLINS, THE COLORADO STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 58 (2002).
64
See, e.g., REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 545 (Albany, N.Y., William
G. Bishop & William H. Attree, 1846) [hereinafter NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF 1846] (remarks of Mr. Bascom complaining of the costs of juror fees to counties); id. at
732 (remarks of Mr. Brown, explaining that he could not support the use of grand and petit
juries in county courts because of the expense to the counties); 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS CONVENED 1869, at 307
(1870) [hereinafter ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1869–1870] (minority report
of the Committee on Counties, discussing expense of juror fees and mileage in large counties);
COLORADO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875–1876, supra note 62, at 70–71 (remarks
of E.T. Wells offering a resolution that “no jury be summoned to attend statedly in any court
for the trial of issues in civil cases, and that the fees of jurors and the costs of summoning
them shall not be made a public charge, but shall be taxed as other costs are”); NEW YORK
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra, at 724 (“Address to the People,” explaining
that civil juries were permitted to consist of fewer than twelve, “thereby materially reducing
the expenses of our courts.”).
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fees of jurors and the costs of summoning them.65 Members of the conventions also
criticized the costs of jury trial to the jurors themselves. One member of the New York
Constitutional Convention of 1846 explained:
I would respect the just rights of all litigants, but at the same time
remember that men who are not litigants have rights also and
ought not to be dragged from their own business by dozens to settle other people’s quarrels, when half a dozen would answer all
the ends of justice.66
The importance of the civil jury as a political institution was fading. Most state constitutional conventions believed more flexibility was needed.
B. The Seventh Amendment and Nullification of a Different Sort
Although a right to criminal jury trial in federal courts was well-accepted among
the framers of the U.S. Constitution,67 a right to civil jury trial was controversial.
When the question of requiring civil jury trial was raised late in the Convention in

65

ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1869–1870, supra note 64, at 307;
COLORADO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875–1876, supra note 62, at 70–71.
66
NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 64, at 111 (remarks
of Mr. Hunt); see also infra Part II.C.1.
67
The draft that the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 produced and sent to the states for
ratification required criminal jury trial in the federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The
Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .”). In The
Federalist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton wrote of the agreement of the framers concerning
criminal jury trial:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the [federal constitutional] convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they
set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it
consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty;
the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government. . . . But
I must acknowledge that I cannot readily discern the inseparable connection between the existence of liberty and the trial by jury in civil cases.
Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended
offenses, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions have ever
appeared to me to be the great engines of judicial despotism; and these
have all relation to criminal proceedings. The trial by jury in criminal
cases . . . seems therefore to be alone concerned in the question. And
[criminal jury trial is] provided for in the most ample manner in the plan
of the convention.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The Sixth
Amendment reiterates the requirement of criminal jury trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Philadelphia in 1787,68 several framers argued against it,69 and their arguments persuaded most members.70 In The Federalist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton undertook
to justify why the Philadelphia Convention had not included a right to civil jury trial
in the Federal Constitution.71 Hamilton observed that drafting such a right would be
difficult.72 The federal courts had no existing practice, and therefore the formulations
used by the states concerning preservation were useless.73 The states varied considerably in their use of jury trial, forcing a hazardous choice among the different practices in drafting a federal right.74 Such questions were best left to the legislature.75
Even more important, in Hamilton’s view, some civil cases were not appropriate for
resolution by juries.76 Cases involving the law of nations, such as prize cases, involved
complicated questions of law unfamiliar to jurors and could spark wars with foreign
powers if not decided correctly and consistently.77 Equity cases required a large amount
of discretion and were often too complicated and lengthy for trial by lay jurors.78
Despite these arguments, ratifying conventions in several states viewed a right to
civil jury trial in federal courts as so important that they recommended the inclusion
of such a right in an amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and in some cases almost
conditioned ratification on such a right.79 Why? The Anti-Federalists were not simply
paying ritual obeisance to the people or indulging showy rhetoric. They wanted results in civil cases that judges would not produce. The legislature might be captured
by special interests of various kinds, and legislate against the good of the whole.80
68

George Mason raised the question of a bill of rights, including a right to civil jury trial,
late in the proceedings, on September 12, five days before the convention was to adjourn.
See James Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention, in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587–88 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter Farrand, RECORDS].
69
See id. (arguments of Nathaniel Gorham and Roger Sherman); id. at 628 (arguments
of Nathaniel Gorham, Rufus King, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney).
70
Id. at 628.
71
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 469–71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
72
Id. at 471.
73
Id. at 471–72.
74
Id. at 470–76.
75
Id. at 471, 477.
76
Id. at 472–73.
77
Id. During the Revolutionary War, state admiralty courts used juries to determine prize
cases, leading to inconsistent results that ignored established legal principles. See Harrington,
supra note 23, at 176–79. Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia also feared jury decisions
in prize cases. “Would you have a jury to determine the case of a capture? . . . These depend
on the law of nations, and no twelve men that could be picked up could be equal to the decision
of such a matter.” 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 431 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter Elliot, DEBATES].
78
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 473 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
79
States that recommended an amendment to the Federal Constitution guaranteeing civil
jury trial included Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island. See
Henderson, supra note 23, at 298.
80
See id.
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The executive might use its power to reward friends or to punish political enemies.81
The civil jury, in both England and America, had proved useful in awarding damages
in trespass suits against executive officials.82 The judiciary might be corrupt83 or
biased in favor of elites.84 The jury could check all of these abuses.
Beside these general arguments, the Anti-Federalists had specific existing laws
in mind for nullification. These were the laws of contract, which provided that debtors
should pay their creditors.85 During the Revolutionary War and its aftermath, rapid
inflation and deflation, together with contract clauses requiring payment in hard currency, made it difficult for debtors to pay.86 State legislatures passed various laws
that made it easier for debtors to escape creditors’ demands.87 In addition, state juries
were sympathetic to debtors.88 By contrast, the new Federal Constitution contained
81

See id. at 185–86.
See, e.g., Erving v. Cradock (1761), reprinted in BERNARD PAPERS, supra note 28;
Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 (C.P. 1763), 98 Eng. Rep. 489; Huckle v. Money, 19
How. St. Tr. 1404 (C.P. 1763), 95 Eng. Rep. 768; Beardmore v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr.
1405 (C.P. 1764), 95 Eng. Rep. 790; Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765),
95 Eng. Rep. 807; Money v. Leach, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001 (K.B. 1765), 97 Eng. Rep. 1075;
Wilkes v. Halifax, 19 How. St. Tr. 1406 (C.P. 1769); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 775–78 (1994); Bradford R. Clark, The
Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1905–06
(2010); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs,
44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14, 19 (1972).
83
See 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 68, at 587 (argument of Elbridge Gerry); Harrington,
supra note 23, at 187 (quoting arguments of Anti-Federalists). Alexander Hamilton agreed that
this was the strongest argument in favor of civil juries. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 468
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). He observed, however, that jurors could
be corrupted as well as judges. Id. at 468–69.
84
See Harrington, supra note 23, at 187 (quoting arguments of Anti-Federalists). This
was Blackstone’s principal argument in favor of the jury.
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons
and our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely
intrusted to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally
selected by the prince, or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state,
their decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will have frequently
an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and dignity; it is
not to be expected from human nature, that the few should be always
attentive to the interests and good of the many. On the other hand, if the
power of judicature were placed at random in the hands of the multitude,
their decisions would be wild and capricious, and a new rule of action
would be every day established in our courts.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379.
85
Wolfram reviewed in detail the arguments linking debtors and the right to civil jury
trial in the state ratifying conventions. Wolfram, supra note 23, at 673–703.
86
Id. at 674.
87
Id. at 674–75; Harrington, supra note 23, at 170–72.
88
Harrington, supra note 23, at 173–74; Wolfram, supra note 23, at 675–76.
82
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various provisions that favored creditors, including the Contracts Clause, which forbids the states to enact laws impairing the obligation of contracts.89 (Federalists generally thought it imperative to repay debts, for the credit and prosperity of the new
nation.90 ) Debtors thus faced the prospect of being sued in federal court by their foreign and out-of-state creditors, under diversity jurisdiction, without a jury to nullify the
debt. Furthermore, Article III gave the Supreme Court the power to exercise “appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact.”91 Even if a federal court sat with a jury, therefore, the jury’s findings might be re-examined and overturned on appeal. Worse, a
state jury verdict might be overturned by a federal court on appeal.92 Anti-Federalists
alluded to these dangers many times in the ratification debates.93 There were deep
contradictions inherent in allowing juries to nullify law in a democratic republic. It
would have been difficult to argue openly that a handful of citizens should be able to
nullify the official acts of representatives elected by the entire voting population, and
operating according to carefully designed procedures. Not surprisingly, in view of
these contradictions, Anti-Federalists avoided openly praising juries for nullifying
debts.94 Nevertheless, the implication was clear. One of Patrick Henry’s speeches to
the Virginia ratifying convention gives an example of how the connection between
juries and debtors could be suggested without declaring it precisely:
Of what advantage is it to the American congress to take away this
great and general security [of a bill of rights]? I ask of what advantage is it to the public or to congress, to drag an unhappy debtor,
not for the sake of justice, but to gratify the malice of the plaintiff,
with his witnesses to the federal court, from a great distance?
What was the principle that actuated the convention in proposing
to put such dangerous powers in the hands of any one? Why is
the trial by jury taken away? All the learned arguments that have
been used on this occasion do not prove that it is secured.95
James Madison attempted to respond to these concerns in drafting the Seventh
Amendment.96 The first issue was the existence of civil juries in federal courts;97 the
89

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
See Harrington, supra note 23, at 173–76.
91
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
92
See Harrington, supra note 23, at 220.
93
See Wolfram, supra note 23, at 679–82.
94
See id. at 679–80.
95
3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 77, at 302.
96
Madison was anxious to avoid a second constitutional convention, which in his mind
was a real possibility. See Harrington, supra note 23, at 222, 227. In addition, North Carolina
and Rhode Island had not yet ratified the Constitution. Id. at 223.
97
By the time Madison drafted the Seventh Amendment, Congress had already hammered
out a compromise on civil juries in the Judiciary Act of 1789, specifying that federal courts
90
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second was the re-examination of juries’ verdicts by judges. Regarding the first issue,
Madison had before him a number of different suggestions and models from the
states.98 Because the states’ use of civil juries varied so greatly, and because Madison
was unenthusiastic about the need for such a right,99 he rejected all of the states’ proposals. (Among the proposals that Madison rejected was New York’s, which specified
“the common law of England.”100 ) He instead came up with a vague formulation: “In
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”101 This became known as the Preservation
Clause. Regarding the second issue, Madison drafted language to limit the scope of
federal appeals of jury verdicts, which the Anti-Federalists feared. Congress approved
the following language: “[A]nd no fact found by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined
in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”102
This became known as the Re-examination Clause. The Re-examination Clause has
no counterpart in any state constitution. Its independent significance became clear in
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, as discussed in Part III. It was the Re-examination
Clause that prompted Joseph Story’s test based on the English common law,103 as
well as the Supreme Court’s strict historical interpretation of that test through the
early twentieth century.104
II. PROMINENT THEMES IN INTERPRETATION OF RIGHTS TO CIVIL JURY TRIAL
AFTER THE FOUNDING THROUGH THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
The Anti-Federalists valued and sought to preserve the civil jury’s law-nullifying
function but that very characteristic soon came to be seen as a liability. The AntiFederalists had wanted local juries to decide law based on local sentiment, so as to
prevent a centralized tyranny. Increasingly, however, Americans in all areas were
would sit with juries in diversity cases, but not admiralty or revenue cases. See Judiciary Act
of 1789, §§ 9, 12, 1 Stat. 73; Harrington, supra note 23, at 226–27. The Seventh Amendment
therefore appeared as something of an anticlimax, not disturbing an arrangement already
agreed to.
98
See Harrington, supra note 23, at 217–22.
99
Madison had argued strenuously against a need for a civil jury right in the Virginia ratifying convention. See 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 77, at 487, 489.
100
1 id. at 362.
101
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Akhil Amar has argued that the Seventh Amendment incorporates state jury practices. AMAR, supra note 23, at 88–93. In light of the work of Matthew
Harrington and Stanton Krauss, this seems unlikely. Harrington, supra note 23, at 217–27;
Krauss, supra note 23, at 445–47.
102
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Stanton D. Krauss has proposed that the common law of
England was intended to be the reference for the Re-examination Clause, but not for the
Preservation Clause. See Krauss, supra note 23, at 447–51.
103
See United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
104
See infra Part III.
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concerned with regional and national economic development.105 Predictable, uniform legal rules helped promote that development.106 Use of civil juries could lead
to unlawful, unpredictable results that undermined the authority of legislatures and
courts, and thwarted the ability to plan and carry out actions.
The desire for juries to protect debtors did not disappear, but it became less politically potent.107 Some judges and delegates to constitutional conventions also
stressed the jury’s value in checking the judiciary generally.108 John Reid’s study of
105

Acknowledging the danger of summing up “long periods and great movements in a
sentence,” Lawrence Friedman has written of American law in the nineteenth century:
[G]radually, a new set of attitudes developed, in which the primary
function of law was . . . economic growth and service to its users. In this
period, people came to see law, more and more, as a utilitarian tool: a
way to protect property and the established order, of course, but beyond
that, to further the interests of the middle class mass, to foster growth,
to release and harness the energy latent in the commonwealth . . . .
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 114 (2d ed. 1985).
106
In the North, judges such as James Kent, Joseph Story, Isaac Parker, and Jeremiah Smith
worked to create uniform national private law that furthered commercial development and
constrained juries. See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 286–87
(2005); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL
NEW HAMPSHIRE 107, 115–30 (2004); John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History
of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 566–69 (1993); Renée B. Lettow, New Trial
for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 519–21 (1996) [hereinafter Lettow, New Trial]. In the South,
judges such as Joseph Lumpkin of Georgia and Hamilton Gamble of Missouri wanted to encourage commercial and industrial development and predictable legal rules. See DENNIS K.
BOMAN, LINCOLN’S RESOLUTE UNIONIST: HAMILTON GAMBLE, DRED SCOTT DISSENTER AND
MISSOURI’S CIVIL WAR GOVERNOR 18–22 (2006); PAUL DEFOREST HICKS, JOSEPH HENRY
LUMPKIN: GEORGIA’S FIRST CHIEF JUSTICE 63–72 (2002); TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE
SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATE JUDGES AND SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790–
1890, at 73–74, 81–86 (1999).
107
At the New York Constitutional Convention of 1846, one delegate argued that even cases
involving small amounts of money should go to jury trial. He immediately added that “[h]e
was not sure but he would abolish all laws for the collection of debts, and leave the matter to
the honesty and integrity of men.” NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra
note 64, at 549 (remarks of Mr. Swackhamer). Another delegate mocked this suggestion,
stating that he, at least, “had not yet to learn . . . the great use in civilized society of laws for
the collection of debts.” Id. (remarks of Mr. Hoffman). So concerned were the framers of the
Georgia Constitution of 1868 about juries nullifying debts that they inserted a provision to
prevent it: “The court shall render judgment without the verdict of a jury in all civil cases
founded on contract, where an issuable defence is not filed on oath.” GA. CONST. of 1868,
art. V, § 3, cl. 3.
108
See, e.g., Zylstra v. Corp. of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 395–96 (S.C. 1794)
(explaining that the purpose of the jury in America was to prevent judicial bias in favor of
the rich and influential); NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 64,
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New Hampshire during the early republic shows that the rationale favored by supporters of the jury shifted over time.109 Instead of conceiving the jury mainly as a
check on legislative or executive power, proponents of the autonomous jury in New
Hampshire in the early nineteenth century praised it as a check on the judiciary.110
Interest in the jury as a check on judicial officers may have been a reason why some
courts, legislatures, and constitutional conventions authorized justices of the peace
and other inferior courts to sit with juries, ordinarily of six persons.111 By the middle
at 545 (remarks of Mr. Porter) (arguing that the purpose of the jury in America was “to protect the rights of the people from the overshadowing encroachments and the tremendous
power of the judiciary”).
109
See REID, supra note 106, at 118–19.
110
See id. at 116–17.
111
The six-person juries that sat with justices of the peace were discussed in some detail
in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1846. See NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 64, at 545 (remarks of Charles O’Conor) (declaring that
“the introduction of six men [in justices’ courts] amounted to nothing, as there was no necessity for them, according to the statute, and they formed no part of the old institution of trial
by jury. They were an illegitimate jury.”). Several of the delegates expressed concern about the
partiality of justices of the peace. See id. at 720 (remarks of Mr. Chatfield) (protesting the
expansion of the exclusive and conclusive jurisdiction of justices of the peace, arguing that
justices were ignorant and “often act under the influence of neighborhood excitement, catching
the prevailing spirit, and being moved by its impulse”); id. at 721 (remarks of Mr. Crooker)
(arguing that the justices “are too often controlled by some sectional power and influence”).
One delegate, who claimed an extensive practice before justice courts, also denounced jurors
in justice courts in strong terms.
The manner of selecting juries in justices’ courts was defective and
opened the door for the most gross corruption. The constable if he was
honest, summoned those who were nearest at hand and who were generally unfit to be trusted with the decision of causes. He could not for
the pittance paid him for the service, select the jury with care from
competent, safe and intelligent men. The idlers and vagabonds who had
no business of their own, hanging around the court, like vultures around
a carcass, formed the great mass of its juries. In very many causes the
evil was of a stronger character. In strongly contested trials the people
discussed the merits and took sides with the parties in the contest—A
corrupt constable would summon a jury at the selection and dictation
of the plaintiff, who always chooses his ground on which to prosecute,
as well as the officer to serve his process.
Id. (remarks of Mr. Crooker). For constitutional provisions authorizing inferior courts to sit
with fewer than twelve jurors, see, for example, IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 9 (“The right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the General Assembly may authorize trial by a jury
of a less number than twelve men in inferior courts . . . .”); ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 5
(“The right of trial by jury, as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate; but the trial of civil
cases before justices of the peace by a jury of less than twelve men, may be authorized by
law.”); MO. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 28 (“The right of trial by jury, as heretofore enjoyed,
shall remain inviolate; but a jury for the trial of criminal or civil cases, in courts not of record,
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of the nineteenth century, however, those arguing that the jury served as a valuable
check tended to be outnumbered by those concerned with the jury’s inefficiencies.112
A pronounced shift occurred from considering the civil jury as a political institution to considering the civil jury as a judicial institution. And in the latter respect,
many judges and commentators thought the civil jury fell short. We have already seen
Hamilton’s concerns about the capacity of civil juries.113 Tocqueville, although he
thought the civil jury was a good device for educating the people in law and government, admitted that “its usefulness can be contested” if the question were how far the
civil jury “facilitates the good administration of justice.”114 The use of juries posed
serious difficulties for the administration of civil justice, apart from any deliberate
law nullifying. As judges commented in the cases discussed below, jury trial became
increasingly time-consuming, expensive, and prone to delays.115 Juries sometimes
lacked the technical expertise and understanding that might be necessary for decisionmaking in a complex society and economy.116 Judges emphasized jury control117 and
avoidance. They allowed legislatures discretion in modifying civil jury trial.
This Part examines prominent themes found in court decisions, arguments of
counsel, members of state constitutional conventions, and legal commentators concerning constitutional rights to civil jury trial. Although some regional and temporal
variation did exist, these themes were remarkably uniform throughout the nation and
over the course of the nineteenth century. Compared with other features of the legal
systems—such as judicial comment on evidence,118 judicial elections,119 and formal
mechanisms to control jury verdicts120—the uniformity is striking.
may consist of less than twelve men, as may be prescribed by law.”); NEB. CONST. of 1875,
art. I, § 6 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the legislature may authorize
trial by a jury of a less number than twelve men in courts inferior to the district court.”); GA.
CONST. of 1877, art. VI, § 18 (“The right of trial by jury, except where it is otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall remain inviolate, but the General Assembly may prescribe
any number, not less than five, to constitute a trial or traverse jury in Courts other than the
Superior and City Courts.”). The six-person jury in justice courts is a phenomenon that would
benefit from more study.
112
See infra Part II.C.1.
113
See supra text accompanying notes 71–78.
114
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 26, at 270–71.
115
See infra text accompanying notes 231–44.
116
See infra text accompanying notes 252–61.
117
See Lettow, New Trial, supra note 106, at 518–21, 524–26, 542–47; Renée Lettow
Lerner, The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases Before the Federal Rules
of 1938, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 463–73 (2013) [hereinafter Lerner, Directed Verdict].
118
See Lerner, The Silent Judge, supra note 18, at 241–61 (describing variation among
states in permitting or forbidding judicial comment on the evidence).
119
See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA passim (2012) (describing variation in adoption of judicial elections).
120
See Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 463–518 (describing variation among
states in use of mechanisms to control jury verdicts, including demurrer, nonsuit, directed
verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
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A. Praise of Trial by Jury, with Qualifications
If one looked only at the rhetorical phrases used by lawyers and judges in the early
nineteenth century to describe jury trial, one would never guess that such a momentous
shift in attitudes toward the civil jury was going on. The words “palladium,” “sacred,”
“bulwark,” “protection,” and “liberty” abound in the arguments of counsel and judicial
opinions in connection with trial by jury.121 Members of state constitutional conventions
also used these phrases, albeit more sparingly.122 The rhetoric used by revolutionaries
and politicians of the early republic continued. Lawyers and judges stressed the great
age of the custom, and extolled the provision of the Magna Carta concerning “the
judgment of his peers” and “the law of the land.”123
Reading the praise carefully, however, reveals important qualifications. Judges
showed little consistency in giving reasons for the jury’s supposed benefits.124 Courts
also sharply distinguished the importance of criminal from civil juries.125
One of the most influential early cases concerning the right to jury trial actually rejected the most common rationale for it, although the judge found another. In Zylstra
v. Corporation of Charleston126 in 1794, Judge Thomas Waties of South Carolina
observed that, in England, the jury was valued as a barrier to prevent tyranny by the
government.127 He believed the problem of government usurpation of the people’s
rights did not exist in democratic America.128 He explained, however, that the jury was
valuable for another reason: to help prevent judicial bias in favor of rich and influential

121

See, e.g., Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 424 (Pa. 1808) (Yeates, J.) (“sacred inherent
right of every citizen”); Keddie v. Moore, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 41, 44 (1811) (“sacred right of every
citizen”); Beers v. Beers, 4 Conn. 535, 539 (1823) (“palladium of our rights”); Bank of the
State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 604 (1831) (“the most distinguishing badge of liberty”);
Lewis v. Garrett’s Adm’rs, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 434, 457 (1841) (“one of the strongest
bulwarks of human rights”); Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 206 (1848)
(“palladium,” “blessed protection”); Steuart v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Md. 500, 514 (1855)
(“highly valued privilege of trial by jury”).
122
See, e.g., NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 64, at 544
(remarks of Mr. Worden) (“palladium of individual rights” and “great safeguard of individual
rights”); id. at 545 (remarks of Mr. O’Conor) (“ancient and sacred”); id. (remarks of Mr.
Bascom) (“sacred right”); id. at 546 (remarks of Mr. Porter) (“too sacred a right to be interfered with”).
123
See, e.g., Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819) (interpreting the
Bill of Rights of Maryland, art. XXI, which incorporated that provision of the Magna Carta);
Tift v. Griffin, 5 Ga. 185, 188–89 (1848) (Nisbet, J.); Flint River, 5 Ga. at 195 (Lumpkin, J.).
124
See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 146.
125
See infra text accompanying notes 126–47.
126
1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382 (S.C. 1794) (Waties, J.).
127
Id. at 395.
128
Id. at 395–96 (“[H]ere, it can be wanted for no such purpose; the government and the
people have the same common interests, and the same common views . . . .”).
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private persons.129 This was Blackstone’s principal argument in favor of the jury.130
Waties’s concern was understandable in a society such as eighteenth-century South
Carolina, in which the wealthy planters dominated society and made their influence
felt in the courts.131 Even so, his praise was not extravagant: Use of the jury provided
“a better chance, generally, that the poor [would] receive an equal measure of justice
with the rich.”132
Other courts gave the traditional justification for the jury but emphasized its limited scope. Judge Trotter of the Mississippi High Court of Errors and Appeals declared
in an opinion in 1841 that jury trial was “designed simply to guard the people against
the arbitrary or capricious interference of the government.”133 After the obligatory
praise of the Magna Carta,134 Trotter explained:
[I]t is not regarded as any infringement of [the English people’s]
rights thus solemnly pledged, that in the arrangement and distribution of the powers in the several courts which have grown up
under the common law in that country, modes of trial in many
cases are allowed which dispense with the verdict of a jury.135
In some cases, fulsome praise for the jury seemed a disguise for undermining it.
The Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, Joseph Lumpkin, used this tactic
in a case in 1848 concerning the right to civil jury trial.136 Lumpkin was a Whig eager
for economic expansion, a devout Presbyterian zealous in promoting educational and
moral causes, and a legal reformer impatient with the crusty traditions of the common
129

Id. at 396 (“In a country like ours, so thinly peopled, where, as in all societies, every man
of any consideration has extensive private connexions, and often a secret interest in courting
popular favour; if the power of proceeding to judgment, in all cases, was committed to a permanent body of men, it would sometimes happen that private affection or party views would
intermingle in the trial of right, and prevent a fair and impartial decision. But when the rights
of the citizens are to be determined on by 12 men, changed at every court, and indiscriminately
drawn from every class of their fellow-citizens, there will be a better chance, generally, that the
poor will receive an equal measure of justice with the rich, and that the decision of facts will
be according to the truth of them.”).
130
See supra note 84.
131
See MICHAEL STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND
AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767–1878, at 1, 3, 5, 15 (1980).
132
Zylstra, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 396.
133
Lewis v. Garrett’s Adm’rs, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 434, 454 (1841). The U.S. Supreme
Court explained the provisions of the Magna Carta similarly: “[T]hey were intended to secure
the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice.” Bank of Columbia v. Okely,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
134
Lewis, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) at 455.
135
Id.
136
Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 195, 206 (1848).
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law.137 He wrote that he and his colleagues cordially concurred in the “glowing
eulogium” on trial by jury in a recent number of the Monthly Law Reporter.138 (The
Monthly Law Reporter was a periodical published in Boston and edited at the time
by Stephen H. Phillips.139 ) Lumpkin tracked the argument of the “talented Editor”
exactly, up to a point.140 Trial by jury was, he declared with Phillips, “one of the great
elements, the greatest characteristic of free government.”141 Notably, neither Phillips
nor Lumpkin claimed that the jury was efficient or accurate.142 The ostensible virtues
of the jury were different. Echoing Tocqueville,143 Phillips and Lumpkin called the
137

In 1849, a year after his opinion in Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, Lumpkin wrote
in another opinion:
I rejoice to see edifices built . . . “and covered with the moss of many
generations,” swaying beneath the sturdy blows so unsparingly applied
by the hand of reform. Why should the spirit of progress which is abroad
in the world, and which is heaving and agitating the public mind in respect to the arts, sciences, politics and religion, halt upon the vestibule
of our temples of justice?
Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2, 19 (1849). On Joseph Henry Lumpkin (1799–1867), see HICKS,
supra note 106; HUEBNER, supra note 106, at 70–98; Timothy S. Huebner, Joseph Henry
Lumpkin and Evangelical Reform in Georgia: Temperance, Education, and Industrialization,
1830–1860, 75 GA. HIST. Q. 254 (1991).
138
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 205. The article that Lumpkin discussed was written by the Monthly
Law Reporter’s editor, Stephen H. Phillips, and appeared, unsigned, in the July 1848 issue.
Stephen H. Philips, The New York Code of Procedure, 11 MONTHLY L. REP. (n.s. vol. 1) 97
(July 1848) [hereinafter Phillips, The New York Code of Procedure].
139
Stephen Henry Phillips (1823–1897) was born in Salem, Massachusetts, graduated
from Harvard College, and studied at Harvard Law School under Joseph Story. 1 DUANE
HAMILTON HURD, HISTORY OF ESSEX COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS: WITH BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCHES OF MANY OF ITS PIONEERS AND PROMINENT MEN, at xlviii–li (Philadelphia, J.W.
Lewis & Co. 1888). Phillips was a delegate to the first Republican National Convention, in
1856 in Philadelphia, and Attorney General of Massachusetts from 1858 to 1861. Id. In 1866,
King Kamehameha V invited Phillips to come to Honolulu. Phillips became Hawaii’s attorney
general and was appointed to the House of Nobles in 1867. Id. Phillips’s fellow student at
Harvard, William Little Lee, helped draft the 1852 Constitution of the Kingdom of Hawaii
and served as its chief justice. See Christopher D. Hu, Transplanting Servitude: The Strange
History of Hawaii’s U.S.-Inspired Contract Labor Law, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 274, 280 (2013).
140
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 205–06.
141
Id. at 206 (quoting and paraphrasing Phillips, The New York Code of Procedure, supra
note 138, at 109).
142
Lumpkin omitted Phillips’s qualification: “Whatever may be thought of [the jury], as a
means of eliciting truth, and, without claiming for it any mystical virtue, we believe it is equal,
or superior, to any other . . . .” Phillips, The New York Code of Procedure, supra note 138,
at 109.
143
See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 26, at 275 (“[The jury] should be regarded as a free school
which is always open and in which each juror learns his rights, comes into daily contact with
the best-educated and most-enlightened members of the upper classes, and is given practical
lessons in the law, lessons which the advocate’s efforts, the judge’s advice, and also the very
passions of the litigants bring within his mental grasp.”).
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jury a “school,” in which a man learned “to weigh facts, to balance arguments . . .
and [to] deliberat[e].”144 This civic education improved his vote and turned a man into
a citizen.145 In addition, juries saved judges from “isolation from the people,” which
was “the first step toward secret proceedings and arbitrary tribunals.”146 This argument seemed to equate jury trial with the benefits of public trial. Both editor and judge
praised the movement on the continent of Europe toward public trial by jury.147
Judge Lumpkin parted company with Phillips, however, in an important respect.
Phillips’s topic was the new Field Code in New York, governing civil procedure, and
Phillips was concerned about preserving the jury specifically in civil cases.148 Lumpkin
did not mention this in his paraphrase. Rather, Lumpkin—who was deciding a case
about the civil jury—confined his lengthy praise of the jury to criminal cases.149 After
effusions about the criminal jury frothy with moral rhetoric and exclamation points,150
Lumpkin deflatingly observed, “We may, however, after all, doubt the essentiality
of trial by jury in civil cases.”151 Although many states did not distinguish between
the civil and criminal jury in their constitutions, judges often did.152 Like Alexander
144

Flint River, 5 Ga. at 206; Phillips, The New York Code of Procedure, supra note 138,
at 109.
145
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 206; Phillips, The New York Code of Procedure, supra note 138,
at 109.
146
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 206; Phillips, The New York Code of Procedure, supra note 138,
at 109.
147
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 206; Phillips, The New York Code of Procedure, supra note 138,
at 109.
148
See Phillips, The New York Code of Procedure, supra note 138, at 106–11. Phillips
doubted that the way that law and equity were merged in the Field Code would prove lasting.
See id. at 106–09. He was concerned that flexible principles of equity pleading would not be
compatible with the simplification of issues needed for jury trial. See id.
149
See Flint River, 5 Ga. at 206–07.
150
In criminal proceedings, trial by jury cannot be too highly appreciated or
guarded with too much vigilance. So long as this palladium and Habeas
Corpus, remain unimpaired, life and liberty are safe from passion, prejudice, or oppression, no matter from what quarter they emanate. What
security to innocence and what a humane arrangement of the law, that
punishment can only be inflicted by the unanimous decision of twelve
of our honest and impartial neighbors! What are slight inconveniences
in the mode of selecting a jury, compared with this blessed protection!
Long may trial by jury, in criminal cases, the main pillar in the temple
of justice, be continued to the country, and its results be characterized by
wisdom and candor, patience and purity, firmness and independence.
Id. at 206.
151
Id.
152
Id. (“And while it is undoubtedly true, that the provisions, both of the National and
State Constitutions, respecting this institution, apply to civil cases, still it cannot be denied,
that they were mainly and primarily intended to protect inviolate, the trial by jury, in criminal
prosecutions. And courts will watch with more jealousy, any departure from, or trespass
upon trial by jury in the latter class of cases, than the former.”); see REID, supra note 106,
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Hamilton, Lumpkin saw little use for the civil jury. Lumpkin observed that many types
of civil cases were tried daily without a jury.153 “Indeed, it is notorious, that modern
law reform, both in England, and in this country, seeks, amongst other objects, to dispense, as much as possible with juries.”154 He cited as evidence of this trend the provisions for waiver of jury trial in New York’s new Field Code (1848)155 and the recent
County Courts Act (1846)156 in England. The summary proceeding established in the
statute whose constitutionality was at issue in the case before the Georgia Supreme
Court was a further example of that trend. As explained below in Part II.C.2, Lumpkin
and his colleagues held that the proceedings did not violate constitutional rights to
civil jury trial.157 The rhetoric of judges extolling jury trial helped distract attention
from the effect of their decisions, which was to limit it.
B. Use of Flexible Originalist Tests
In order for legislatures and judges to modify civil jury trial, courts had to construe
constitutional provisions to allow them to do so. Constitutional rights to civil jury trial
pose stark problems of interpretation. Nearly all of them refer to a historical baseline,
as we have seen.158 Courts faced the problem of how to give such procedural clauses
meaning without prohibiting legislatures from making any change to any incident of
jury trial.
1. Setting Out the Test: What Was the Time Referenced, and What Was the Law?
Courts, interpreting the unmistakable language of preservation of jury trial in their
state constitutions, settled almost uniformly on an original baseline with respect to
time: the time that their constitutions went into effect.159
at 119 (explaining that Judge Jeremiah Smith of New Hampshire sought to control only the
civil jury, to avoid greater opposition).
153
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 206–07.
154
Id. at 207.
155
Id. (“[A]s a justification for this change, it is stated that in the city of New York, where
the right of election existed as to the mode of trial, 1285 judgments were rendered by the
Court in Marine causes without, against 67 upon the verdict of a jury.”); see 1848 N.Y. Laws
538, at § 221. On the jury waiver provisions of the Field Code, see infra note 345.
156
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 207; see County Courts Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 95 (U.K.). On
the provisions of the County Courts Act concerning jury trial, see Conor Hanly, The Decline
of Civil Jury Trial in Nineteenth-Century England, 26 J. LEGAL HIST. 253, 275–78 (2005).
157
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 194–95.
158
See supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text.
159
See, e.g., Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 424 (Pa. 1808); Singleton v. Madison, 4 Ky.
(1 Bibb) 342, 343 (1809); Keddie v. Moore, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 41, 44–45 (1811); Beers v. Beers,
4 Conn. 535, 538–39 (1823); Morford v. Barnes, 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 444, 445–46 (1835); Colt
v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243, 253 (1837); Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N.H. 19, 26–27 (1840); Flint
River, 5 Ga. at 195, 205; Ross v. Irving, 14 Ill. 171, 179–81 (1852); Lake Erie, Wabash &
St. Louis R.R. v. Heath, 9 Ind. 558, 559–60 (1857); Gaston v. Babcock, 6 Wis. 503, 506–07
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The question of what law was preserved proved somewhat more difficult. The
problem was especially acute in the federal courts, which had virtually no history when
the Seventh Amendment was ratified together with the rest of the Bill of Rights in
1791.160 We saw that in drafting the Seventh Amendment, James Madison had dodged
the issue by simply referring to the “common law.”161 Which common law? As Justice Joseph Story remarked when he addressed the issue as a circuit judge in 1812 in
United States v. Wonson,162 the common law differed among the states.163 Therefore,
he decided that the Seventh Amendment’s Re-examination Clause referred to “the
common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.”164
Would the states also follow English practice? Occasionally, parties argued that
states should, under state constitutional guaranties.165 State courts generally rejected the
idea that English practice controlled state rights to civil jury trial.166 The Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors in 1837 observed that English jury practice had been constantly changing, and indeed had deviated from what the Court considered to be the

(1857); Crandall v. James, 6 R.I. 144, 148 (1859); Shallon v. Bancroft, 4 Minn. 109, 112–13
(1860); Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 499, 503–04 (1861); Sands v. Kimbark, 27 N.Y. 147,
149–53 (1863); Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322, 324–25 (1867); McGear v. Woodruff, 33
N.J.L. 213, 216 (1868); Howe v. Treasurer of Plainfield, 37 N.J.L. 145, 147–48 (1874);
Bothwell v. Bos. Elevated Ry., 102 N.E. 665, 668 (Mass. 1913) (“[T]he trial by jury known
and practised in this State at the time the Constitution was framed and adopted [in 1780] was
the one meant by article 15 of our Bill of Rights.”).
An exception was a line of cases beginning in 1794 in South Carolina, and influential in
Georgia, which regarded the right to trial by jury as “originating in time immemorial,” almost
a natural right. See Zylstra v. Corp. of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 395 (S.C. 1794)
(“[T]he trial by jury is a common law right; not the creature of the constitution, but originating in time immemorial; it is the inheritance of every individual citizen, the title to which
commenced long before the political existence of this society; and which has been held and
used inviolate by our ancestors, in succession, from that period to our own time . . . .”); see
also State v. Allen, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 55, 60 (1822) (citing Zylstra, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at
382); Tift v. Griffin, 5 Ga. 185, 190, 192 (1848).
160
See Harrington, supra note 23, at 150 (“Although the [Seventh] Amendment was designed to reinforce the founders’ commitment to the principle of trial by jury in civil cases,
it did not define the precise scope of the right.”).
161
See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.
162
28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
163
Id. at 750.
164
Id.
165
See, e.g., Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243, 250, 252 (1837) (argument of counsel that
English civil jury selection practices should apply because of the right to jury trial in the
Connecticut and U.S. constitutions).
166
See, e.g., id. at 252 (“To preserve the trial by jury inviolate, cannot mean, that we must
pursue the exact course taken in England to collect jurors.”); cases cited infra note 204. The
Supreme Court of Vermont, however, interpreted its state’s unusual constitutional provision
according to “the immemorial practice . . . in the common law courts of England and of this
country.” Plimpton v. Town of Somerset, 33 Vt. 283, 291 (1860).
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true common law rule with respect to jury selection.167 In any case, the English rule
regarding jury selection had developed in response to the needs of its own society
and legal system, whereas the needs of Connecticut were different.168 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1913, responding to a decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court the same year under the Re-examination Clause, declared firmly: “It is not to be
thought that the framers of our Constitution in 1780, performing their labors in the
midst of the War of the Revolution, had in mind the system of the mother country
rather than that with which they were familiar by daily observation.”169
California courts faced an interesting conundrum and solved it differently than had
the federal courts. The California Constitution of 1849 declared that “[t]he right of trial
by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever.”170 At the time of the
adoption of that Constitution, the civil law was in force in California, and juries were
not used in civil cases.171 In a case in 1860, Koppikus v. State Capitol Commissioners,172
Chief Justice Stephen Field got around this difficulty by holding that the right applied
in cases “according to the course of the common law, as that law is understood in the
several States of the Union.”173 He observed that the framers of the California constitution were, with few exceptions, from states in which the common law prevailed, and
that the vast majority of the people who voted on the constitution’s adoption were
from common law countries.174 In Koppikus, the plaintiff challenged the use of commissioners, rather than a jury, to assess compensation for condemnation of land.175
Field briefly surveyed the law of other states and concluded that the use of commissioners rather than a jury was constitutional.176
Parties sometimes argued, well into the nineteenth century, that the states were
bound by the Seventh Amendment.177 Early state and federal decisions held that the
Seventh Amendment did not apply to the states, and that amendment remains unincorporated today.178 State courts almost uniformly concluded that the laws of their
167

Colt, 12 Conn. at 252 (asking, if Connecticut had to follow English jury practice, “what
time is to be selected; for they have been constantly altering the qualifications, the exemptions and the mode of summoning jurors?”). The then-current English practice was to select
jurors from the county, but Chief Justice Williams explained that the better common law rule
was to select them from the vicinage. Id. at 251–52.
168
Chief Justice Williams explained that it would be a great inconvenience to jurors in
Connecticut to travel from all over the county to hear cases in the city of New Haven. Id. at 252.
169
Bothwell v. Bos. Elevated Ry., 102 N.E. 665, 668 (Mass. 1913).
170
CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 3.
171
See Koppikus v. State Capitol Comm’rs, 16 Cal. 249, 253 (1860).
172
Id.
173
Id. at 254.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 253.
176
Id. at 255 (citing cases from New York and Ohio).
177
See, e.g., Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243, 250 (1837) (argument of counsel); Flint River
Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 196, 200 (1848) (same).
178
See Jackson v. Wood, 2 Cow. 819, 819–21 (N.Y. 1824) (holding that the Seventh
Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not apply to the states); Barron v. Mayor of
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state at the time the constitutional provision went into effect formed the relevant
historical baseline.179
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (stating that the limitations on government power
in the Federal Bill of Rights apply only to the federal government); Livingston’s Lessee v.
Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551–52 (1833) (stating that the Federal Bill of Rights, and
specifically the Seventh Amendment, does not apply to the states); Colt, 12 Conn. at 251–52
(“So far as it regards the constitution of the United States, it is not necessary to examine what
effect it could have upon this question [of civil jury trial]; because it has been well settled,
that the amendments to that instrument were never intended to limit the power or to controul
[sic] the proceedings of the state courts.”). Some courts, however, did not bother to reject the
applicability of the Seventh Amendment in holding that a law was constitutional. See, e.g.,
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 194.
179
See, e.g., Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 424 (Pa. 1808); Singleton v. Madison, 4 Ky.
(1 Bibb) 342, 343 (1809); Keddie v. Moore, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 41, 44–45 (1811); Morford v.
Barnes, 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 444, 445–46 (1835); Colt, 12 Conn. at 253; Backus v. Lebanon,
11 N.H. 19, 26–27 (1840); Tift v. Griffin, 5 Ga. 185, 189 (1848) (Nisbet, J.) (“The people
of this State, then, are entitled to the trial by jury, as it was used in the State prior to the
Constitution of ’98.”); Ross v. Irving, 14 Ill. 171, 179–81 (1852) (holding that a law allowing
the appointment of seven commissioners to assess the value of improvements to land was unconstitutional under Illinois’s right to jury trial, in a case argued unsuccessfully by Abraham
Lincoln before the Illinois Supreme Court); Lake Erie, Wabash & St. Louis R.R. Co. v.
Heath, 9 Ind. 558, 559–60 (1857); Gaston v. Babcock, 6 Wis. 503, 506–07 (1857); Crandall
v. James, 6 R.I. 144, 148 (1859); Shallon v. Bancroft, 4 Minn. 109, 113 (1860); Stilwell v.
Kellogg, 14 Wis. 499, 503–04 (1861); Sands v. Kimbark, 27 N.Y. 147, 149–53 (1863); Tabor
v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322, 324–25 (1867); McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N.J. L. 213, 216 (1868);
Howe v. Treasurer of Plainfield, 37 N.J.L. 145, 147–48 (1874); Bothwell v. Bos. Elevated
Ry., 102 N.E. 665, 668 (Mass. 1913).
Treatise writers described this rule. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 547–48 (1857) (“[W]hen the constitution guarantees the right of trial by
jury, it does not mean to secure that right in all possible instances, but only in those cases in
which it existed when our constitutions were framed.”); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 410 n. 2 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868) (“Those cases
which before the constitution were not triable by jury need not be made so now.”); JOHN
PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY 127 (1877) (“For however the right may be defined
or fixed, the inquiry must be made, as a purely historical fact, when and in what cases it is
a matter of right; for the interpretation has been uniformly given to the operative clauses of
the Constitution . . . that the right is to be confined to those classes of cases only in which it
was used at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, unless it is expressly restricted or
extended to others.” (footnote omitted)).
Few states concluded otherwise. For a time, South Carolina courts looked to a period before the ratification of that state’s constitution; South Carolina’s Constitution copied the Magna
Carta. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Kansas looked to an
unspecified “common law,” rather than to the specific laws of Kansas at the time of the adoption of the constitution. Kimball v. Connor, 3 Kan. 410, 428 (1866) (interpreting Section 5
of the Kansas Bill of Rights: “The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate.”). Vermont had an
unusual constitutional provision: “[W]hen any issue in fact, proper for the cognizance of a
jury is joined in a court of law, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held
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2. How Much Discretion for the Legislature and Courts?
Once these preliminary questions about the originalist baseline had been decided,
however, the task of interpretation was far from over. Did the originalist baseline mean
that the legislature could alter no feature of jury trial? Were the laws at the time the
constitutional provision went into effect thus made part of the Constitution?
Opinions in some early cases raising constitutional challenges to jury practices
discussed at length the practical challenges of a strict originalist test. In the widely
cited 1823 case Beers v. Beers,180 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors considered
the constitutionality of a statutory increase in the amount in controversy limit for
justices of the peace, who sat without juries. The legislature had provided for an appeal to a court that sat with a jury.181 The defendant’s counsel, David Daggett,182 observed that the law created various obstacles to the defendant trying to get a jury trial:
Defendant had to move for an appeal, pay a duty, pay for copies, give bond, and prosecute the appeal.183 Daggett gave a rhetorical flourish at the end of his argument:
Finally, in proportion to the importance of this right [of civil jury
trial], will be the vigilance, not to say jealousy, with which this
court will guard against any violation of it. It is a right which ought
to be held sacred; and should its blessings be ultimately lost, it
will be no reparation to learn from its history, that it has been frittered away, by gradual encroachments and indirect means.184
Daggett’s oratory failed to sway his fellow Federalist, Chief Justice Stephen
Hosmer.185 Chief Justice Hosmer’s opinion, joined by all of his colleagues,186
sacred.” VT. CONST. of 1793, Bill of Rights, art. XII. The Vermont Supreme Court interpreted this provision according to “the immemorial practice . . . in the common law courts
of England and of this country.” Plimpton v. Town of Somerset, 33 Vt. 283, 290 (1860).
180
4 Day 535 (Conn. 1823).
181
Id. at 536; 1821 Conn. Pub. Acts 41.
182
Daggett was an active Federalist politician and held a variety of state offices. From
1833 to 1834, he was Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court. He is reckoned as one
of the three founders of the Yale Law School. See John H. Langbein, Blackstone, Litchfield,
and Yale, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCENTENNIAL LECTURES 33–35
(Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004).
183
Beers, 4 Conn. at 537.
184
Id.
185
On Hosmer, Daggett, and Peters, see Wesley W. Horton, Hosmer to Peters to Daggett,
73 CONN. B.J. 275 (1999). Horton wrote of Hosmer: “Like John Marshall in Washington,
Hosmer had a first-rate legal mind and basically ran the court his way . . . while the other
justices (including Republicans Chapman and Bristol) meekly went along with his views.
Except for one person: John T. Peters.” Id. at 277. Horton described Peters as a “Republican
firebrand” who believed the other justices were betraying Republican principles and the
Constitution of 1818 by going along with Hosmer’s views. Id.
186
Beers, 4 Conn. at 537 (“Chapman, Brainard, and Bristol, Js. were of the same opinion.
Peters, J. at first dissented, but after more mature deliberation, acquiesced in the decision.”).
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rejected this challenge based on both the constitutional text and the drafters’ intent.187 Analyzing the text, Hosmer concluded that the right to trial by jury would be
violated if it were taken away, prohibited, or subjected to “unreasonable and burdensome regulations” similar to a prohibition.188 He continued by discussing the intent
of the drafters: “It never could be the intention of the constitution to tie up the hands
of the legislature, so that no change of jurisdiction could be made, and no regulation,
even of the right of trial by jury, could be had.”189 Hosmer implied that the statutory
change made jury trial in certain circumstances more expensive to the parties. Nevertheless, he held, jury trial “may be subjected to new modes, and even rendered more
expensive, if the public interest demand such alteration.”190 He criticized a “morbid
sensibility” concerning the right to jury trial that might hold unconstitutional a legal
requirement of posting a bond, an increase in jurors’ fees, and other “trivial changes,”
although these might be necessary to promote justice and general convenience.191 He
underscored the importance of balancing various rights and of not treating one right
as trumping all the rest. “As the interests of a state . . . do not essentially depend on
the existence of one right only, but on many, it is proper to preserve them generally,
and not to sacrifice one important consideration to another equally important.”192 The
right to trial by jury was not the only consideration in running a system of civil justice.
Jury trial was enmeshed in a web of other procedures.
Hosmer’s analysis in Beers v. Beers was influential.193 In 1871, the Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut elaborated on its earlier reasoning, remarking that a strict
187

Id. at 539 (“[A] construction of this nature is equally unwarranted by the words, and by
the intention, of the constitution.”).
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. Other courts adopted similar arguments in the context of an appeal from an arbitration
award. In a Pennsylvania case in 1820, a plaintiff who had lost in arbitration wanted to appeal
to a court with a jury. See McDonald v. Schell, 6 Serg. & Rawle 240 (Pa. 1820). A statute
provided such an appeal, on condition that the litigant demanding an appeal first pay the costs
of the opposing party. See id. The plaintiff claimed that he was unable to pay these costs,
“owing to misfortunes,” and argued that this requirement violated Pennsylvania’s constitutional guarantee of jury trial. Id. at 241. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not bother
hearing the arguments of defendant’s counsel, but briskly held that an appeal could not be
entered without payment of costs. Id. at 241–42.
The law may undoubtedly, in certain cases, bear so hard on a poor man,
as almost to deprive him of his appeal. But that will not justify the Court
in deciding that the law is void. All general laws operate with severity in
particular instances. The costs, although paid, are to be recovered again
by the appellant, in case he succeeds in his appeal.
Id.
191
Beers, 4 Conn. at 539.
192
Id. at 539–40.
193
Later cases repeatedly cited it. See, e.g., Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243 (1837) (rejecting a
challenge to a method of selecting jurors); Curtis v. Gill, 34 Conn. 49, 54–56 (1867) (rejecting
a challenge to a change in the jurisdiction of justices of the peace). Theodore Sedgwick, in
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historical test would result in constitutionalizing the statutes in effect in 1818.194 The
court acknowledged that such a rule was “precise and definite,” but for that very reason unsound.195 Circumstances had changed. The expenses of litigation, both to the
public and to the parties, had greatly increased.196 The amount in controversy in this
class of cases was small, certainly smaller than the cost of a jury trial.197 If a party
wanted to appeal to a court with a jury to annoy the adverse party, or to delay justice,
it was well to deny him that opportunity.198 It might happen, however, that a party
might not receive a fair trial before a justice of the peace.199 The court’s response was
pragmatic: “To some extent at least the evil must be endured. Perfect justice in all
cases is hardly attainable from human tribunals.”200 Not every case deserved fullblown jury trial, or elaborate procedures.201 Efficiency was an important consideration
in a legal system.
Other judges also emphasized the unworkable results of a strict originalist test.
Courts observed that such a test would invalidate many important changes to jury
practice, including use of fewer than twelve jurors202 and extension of jury service
to all who were eligible to vote in elections.203 Courts repeatedly emphasized that
circumstances could change, and that the legislature had to have the power to adjust
laws accordingly.204
If legislatures were permitted to innovate, however, at what point did laws violate
the Constitution? Many courts declared that because the line was so difficult to draw,
the legislature had great discretion.205 Some of the first courts to address questions
his treatise on constitutional interpretation, also emphasized the case. See SEDGWICK, supra
note 179, at 547 (citing and paraphrasing Beers v. Beers).
194
Guile v. Brown, 38 Conn. 237, 240–41 (1871).
195
Id. at 241.
196
Id. at 242.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243, 252–53 (citing Beers v. Beers, 4 Conn. 535 (1823)).
203
Id. at 253.
204
See, e.g., Beers, 4 Conn. at 539 (“[T]rial by jury . . . may be subjected to new modes,
and even rendered more expensive, if the public interest demand such alteration.”); Flint River
Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 208 (1848) (“New forums may be erected, and new remedies provided, accommodated to the ever shifting state of society.”); Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1899) (declaring that the legislature, in designing a court system, had
to have “considerable discretion” to adjust it “because of general increase in litigation, or other
change of circumstances”).
205
See, e.g., Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 428 (Pa. 1808) (Brackenridge, J.) (“Yet this is
but an indirect invasion; and the difficulty is to say where it may begin to be an invasion, unless
it is assumed as a principle that it cannot be extended beyond what it was at the time of framing the constitution; and this, taking into view the history and progress of the jurisdiction,
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of constitutional civil jury rights took this position. (Some of the cases addressing the
civil jury right were so early that the opinions included substantial discussions—and
decided affirmations—of the power of judicial review.206 ) In 1808, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania declared:
If then we are not arrested at the precise point where the matter
stood at the framing of the constitution, with respect to an enlargement of the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, how far shall we
go? Where shall we stop? Is it competent for the judiciary to fix
this point? Is it not in the nature of it, a matter of discretion, a question of expediency? And must it not be left to the legislature?207
Later courts echoed this reasoning. The Supreme Court of Georgia in 1848 likewise
permitted the legislature great discretion: “There is no invasion or infringement of the
Constitution, so long as trial by jury is not directly nor indirectly, abolished.”208 Chief
Justice Lumpkin wanted to make sure readers of the opinion understood the power
of the legislature over jury trial. “I repeat, it is impossible to say at what point the
Legislature ought to stop; and if undertaken to be said by the Courts, it must be at
some point of great excess, that such a stand can be made.”209
Other courts tried to craft a test tailored to a particular issue. In 1871, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors proposed an alternative test to strict adherence to the
statutes as of 1818.210 “[T]he legislature may, in conformity to established usage, to
a certain extent change from time to time, as the business interests of the state may
require, the limit below which the state shall not be required to provide for a jury
would seem to be assuming more than is justifiable.”); Beers, 4 Conn. at 539 (“[E]very reasonable regulation . . . directed to the attainment of the public good, must not be deemed
inhibited [by constitutional rights to civil jury trial], because it increases the burden or expense
of the litigating parties.”); Flint River, 5 Ga. at 208 (following a strong assertion of the power
of judicial review and stating that “[w]e cannot think the trial by jury, substantially defeated
by these conditions, though the defendant may, and at times probably will, be subjected to
some inconvenience, in complying. These terms may be onerous, but this is purely a question
of expediency, and one which must, from its very nature, address itself exclusively to the law
maker. And it is difficult to prescribe limits to the power of the Legislature, in this respect.
Cases might arise which would authorize that body to go very far in disregarding the rules
and regulations which are ordinarily observed in the enactment of a law for the assertion and
defence of rights.”).
206
Two of the leading early cases on the subject, from Pennsylvania and North Carolina,
both discussed and firmly declared the power of judicial review for courts of their states. See
Emerick, 1 Binn. at 419–24 (Yeates, J.); Keddie v. Moore, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 41, 44 (1811).
207
Emerick, 1 Binn. at 428 (Brackenridge, J.).
208
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 208.
209
Id.
210
Guile v. Brown, 38 Conn. 237 (1871).
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trial.”211 The court emphasized that the changes had to be “reasonable.”212 The judges
rejected the idea that the legislature could not be trusted with any flexible powers.213
An example of a different type of test was that of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in 1913, addressing the constitutionality of a statute providing for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.214 After stating the standard historical baseline, the
court went on to observe that many changes in Massachusetts jury practice had occurred since the constitution was ratified in 1780, without impairing the constitutional
right.215 For example, in 1780 litigants were entitled to a second jury trial on appeal
from the first. This practice had fallen into disuse, but it was not required under the
constitution.216 The court looked to the “essential characteristics” of trial by jury in
Massachusetts in 1780, not to “minor details or unessential formalities.”217 The court
declared: “The essence of trial by jury is that controverted facts shall be decided by a
jury.”218 The constitutional right was preserved “when each party has one fair opportunity to present to a jury the evidence on which he claims to raise an issue of fact.”219
If there was no issue of fact, a judge could direct a verdict.220 (The court did not
mention that the line between fact and law had changed greatly since 1780.) If a judge
could direct a verdict, then judgment notwithstanding the verdict was constitutional
also.221 Therefore the court upheld the new procedure for jury control, even though
it clearly would not have been permitted in Massachusetts in 1780.222 The court announced with satisfaction that its interpretation of the Massachusetts constitutional
right to jury trial allowed “slightly more flexibility in its adaptation of details to the
changing needs of society without in any degree impairing its essential character” than
the U.S. Supreme Court had allowed in a recent opinion addressing the same issue
under the Seventh Amendment’s Re-examination Clause.223
211

Id. at 241–42; see also Curtis v. Gill, 34 Conn. 49, 55 (1867) (addressing a statute expanding the jurisdiction of justices of the peace and holding that “[s]o long as the legislature
keeps substantially within the limits prescribed to itself by long usage, taking into consideration the relative depreciation in the value of money and the altered condition of the business
interests of the state, we have no disposition to interfere by way of judicial veto”).
212
Guile, 38 Conn. at 242.
213
Id.
214
Bothwell v. Bos. Elevated Ry., 102 N.E. 665 (Mass. 1913).
215
Id. at 668–69.
216
Id. at 668.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 669.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id. (“The statute simply permits that to be done by this court which ought to have been
done at the trial.”). This was a standard argument in judicial opinions at that time. See infra
notes 450–52 and accompanying text.
222
Bothwell, 102 N.E. at 669.
223
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion was Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S.
364 (1913). See infra notes 423–36 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, as we will see in the next section, courts usually found changes to jury
practice to be reasonable and permitted legislatures flexibility.224 Although almost
every court purported to adopt an originalist test, almost no court applied it strictly.
The exception was the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting the Seventh Amendment’s
Re-examination Clause.225 We will see the outcome of that test in Part III.226
C. Avoiding or Controlling Jury Trial
The flexibility of the originalist tests that courts adopted gave legislatures power
to curtail civil jury trial, at least to some extent. Hardly were the new republics founded,
with their constitutional pledges to hold juries “sacred” and “inviolate,” than legislatures began to chip away at civil jury trial. (The process of jury-avoidance actually
dated far back into the colonial era, particularly with respect to arbitration.227 ) Even
at the peak of Jacksonian democracy, legislatures throughout the nation enacted, and
courts permitted, different kinds of jury-avoidance. Several scholars have remarked
on the increasing distrust of juries among the legal profession and other elites in the
late nineteenth century.228 A surprising revelation in cases about constitutional rights
to civil jury trial is how often legislatures tried to avoid the civil jury in the early nineteenth century. Despite the variety of legislation limiting the civil jury, courts rarely
found any of it unconstitutional.229 Legislatures, to be sure, were often careful in the
224

See infra Part II.C.
See, e.g., Slocum, 228 U.S. 364.
226
See infra Part III.
227
Arbitration seems to have been extensive in the colonies. See Bruce H. Mann, The
Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 443 (1984) (finding evidence of extensive arbitration in Connecticut); Eben Moglen,
Commercial Arbitration in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for the Transformation of
American Law, 93 YALE L.J. 135 (1983) (finding similar evidence for New York). Colonial
and early state legislatures enacted legislation promoting arbitration. See James Oldham &
Su Jin Kim, Arbitration in America: The Early History, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 241, 250 n.45
(2013). Some of these statutes allowed arbitration agreements to become court rules and provided that courts enforce arbitration awards with contempt power. See, e.g., id. at 259. Colonial
and early state courts enforced these statutes. See id. at 251–66 (focusing particularly on
Pennsylvania and Maryland). English assize courts in the seventeenth century delegated significant numbers of cases to arbitration. See J.S. COCKBURN, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH ASSIZES
1558–1714, at 137, 335 (1972).
228
See, e.g., Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 486–88; Note, The Changing
Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 190–92 (1964) [hereinafter
Note, The Changing Role of the Jury]. Vast immigration and populist, anticorporate political
movements contributed to this unease. Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 487.
229
A few cases exist in which a court held that a statute violated a constitutional right to
civil jury trial. Some of these cases involved unusual statutes in which the legislature had
flagrantly violated the spirit of the right. See Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.)
599, 603–08, 610, 619–23 (1831) (holding unconstitutional a statute which provided for trial
225
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means they chose to limit juries and the scope of that limitation. Government officials
found it expedient to pay homage to the power of the people. That was the point of
continuing the lavish rhetoric of jury praise. Few persons in the nineteenth century
openly advocated complete abolition of the civil jury. It was expected that civil jury
trial would continue in some form in many cases. Still, the trend toward limiting the
civil jury was unmistakable.
1. Changed Circumstances: Rising Caseloads, Greater Expense of Litigation,
Inconvenience to Jurors (and, Sotto Voce, Juror Incompetence and Bias)
In permitting these innovations, courts gave three practical reasons: growing
docket pressure, rising expense of litigation, and inconvenience to jurors. In certain
cases, judges sometimes added a fourth consideration: jury incompetence or bias.
Opinions often expressed concerns about docket pressure, or “the press of business,” as judges put it.230 Jury trial was viewed as prone to delays.231 Courts also emphasized the expense of litigation to both parties and the public, a problem that grew
over the course of the nineteenth century.232 In an opinion in as early as 1794, Judge
Thomas Waties of South Carolina praised the juryless courts of justices of the peace as
of actions for indebtedness to a particular bank before a special court of equity, consisting of
named judges, from which there was no appeal); Plimpton v. Town of Somerset, 33 Vt. 283,
291–94 (1860) (holding unconstitutional a statute that allowed a judge to refer any civil case
to one or more commissioners who were to try the case and report facts; the judge was to give
judgment on the report unless one of the parties took issue with specific facts and wanted them
tried to a jury; the report was to serve as prima facie evidence of the facts) (the statute was
repealed in 1857, the year after it was enacted). State courts also occasionally held that the use
of commissioners or judges instead of juries to assess the value of property condemned by
the state or possessed by a bona fide occupant violated constitutional rights to civil jury trial.
See Stidger v. Rogers, 2 Ky. 52, 52 (1801) (holding unconstitutional a statute authorizing a
judge to assess the value of property condemned); Armstrong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374, 375–
76 (Ind. 1825) (holding unconstitutional a statute providing for assessment of the value of
improvements to land by three commissioners). Courts sometimes construed legislation narrowly so as to avoid a constitutional difficulty under rights to civil jury trial. See Dawson v.
Shaver, 1 Blackf. 204, 205–07 (Ind. 1822); Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322, 325–26 (1867).
230
Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 212 (1848). The U.S. Supreme Court
often in the nineteenth century expressed concern about growing docket pressure. See, e.g.,
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1899) (holding that the legislature could expand the jurisdiction of justices of the peace because of the “general increase in litigation”).
231
See, e.g., Capital Traction Co., 174 U.S. at 44; REID, supra note 106, at 119 (discussing
Jeremiah Smith’s belief that limiting jurors in civil suits would “lessen expense and delays”
of the New Hampshire Superior Court).
232
See, e.g., Guile v. Brown, 38 Conn. 237, 242 (1871) (explaining that the expense of litigation had greatly increased, both to parties and the public); Capital Traction Co., 174 U.S. at
44–45 (permitting the expansion of jurisdiction of justices of the peace “to prevent unnecessary
delay and unreasonable expense” of jury trial).
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necessary for poor citizens to obtain justice.233 Poor citizens, he wrote, could not afford
long absences from home, needed speedy recovery, and sued for small amounts that
could not bear “the expense and delay” of a jury trial.234 Waties quoted Blackstone:
“‘Even injustice is better than procrastination.’”235 Some commentators complained
about the length and expense of selecting a jury.236 The time consumed in voir dire in
certain types of cases increased throughout the nineteenth century, as judges permitted
more questioning of potential jurors and challenges on more grounds.237 The Supreme
Court of Georgia in 1848, in upholding summary proceedings against constitutional
challenge, remarked that those non-jury proceedings were “a vast saving of time,
trouble, and expense, to suitors and the country.”238 Courts explained that a flourishing economy required efficient procedure.239 Members of constitutional conventions
often discussed the costs to counties of summoning juries and of jury fees.240 Some
233

Zylstra v. Corp. of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382 (S.C. 1794) (Waties, J.).
Id. at 393; see also Capital Traction Co., 174 U.S. at 44 (explaining that the legislature
had “considerable discretion” to expand the jurisdiction of justices of the peace “to prevent
unnecessary delay and unreasonable expense”).
235
Zylstra, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 393 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442).
236
NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 64, at 544 (remarks
of Arphaxed Loomis) (“[W]e have seen recently great abuses of this jury system; have seen
large sums of money and a month of time consumed in getting a jury.”).
237
Timothy C. Doherty, Jr., The Origins of Voir Dire Practice in the United States 28–31
(2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Yale Law Library).
238
Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 207 (1848). Chief Justice Lumpkin
added, “Whether these considerations should outweigh the advantages resulting from a personal participation, by every citizen, in the practical administration of public justice, it does
not become me to say.” Id.
239
See, e.g., id. at 217 (“We submit, whether the interests both of agriculture and commerce,
do not justify and require the present [summary] proceeding to be supported? We maintain that
they do.”).
240
See, e.g., NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 64, at 732
(remarks of Mr. Brown) (arguing that the convention should lessen expenses to the counties
by reducing the number of jurors); ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1869–1870,
supra note 64, at 307 (minority report of the Committee on Counties, discussing expense of
juror fees and mileage in large counties); COLORADO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1875–1876, supra note 62, at 70–71 (remarks of J.H. Wells) (offering a resolution that “no
jury be summoned to attend statedly in any court for the trial of issues in civil cases, and that
the fees of jurors and the costs of summoning them shall not be made a public charge, but
shall be taxed as other costs are”); id. at 724 (“Address to the People,” explaining that civil
juries were permitted to consist of fewer than twelve, “thereby materially reducing the expenses of our courts.”). Compare NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra
note 64, at 545 (remarks of Mr. Bascom) (“There was great expense involved in these trials
by jury. In the county of Ontario during the past year, the amount paid out of the treasury for
jury fees was greater than the entire amount of verdicts rendered by them in civil cases.”),
with id. at 545 (remarks of Mr. Worden) (observing that some of those fees were for jurors
in criminal cases).
234

848

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:811

delegates argued that despite the expense of civil jury trial, the institution served as
a valuable check on the power of the judiciary.241 These arguments, however, were
few compared with complaints about expense and delay.
Courts in the late nineteenth century were especially concerned about growing
docket pressure, delays, and litigation expense.242 One cause of this greater docket
pressure was the increasing number of industrial accident cases, which involved complicated questions of negligence and were much more expensive and time-consuming
to try than the simple debt cases that had dominated dockets earlier.243 Judges therefore tried to limit the number of new trials; directed verdict was often the method
of choice.244
Judges and commentators worried about inconvenience to citizens called to serve
on juries.245 The time, expense, and discomfort of travel for jury service could be
onerous.246 Judge Waties of South Carolina remarked that because of the frequency
of sittings of justices of the peace, and the “thinness of our society,” it would be “an
insupportable grievance to the citizens to serve as jurors in all” of these cases.247 The
authors of New York’s Field Code of 1848 explained in their report that jury service
was “[o]ne of the most burthensome duties of the citizen.”248 The authors went on to
express their hope that providing for waiver of jury trial would lessen this burdensome
duty.249 In curtailing the power of the jury, it was helpful to emphasize the benefit
241

See, e.g., NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 64, at 545–
46 (remarks of Mr. Porter); id. at 546 (remarks of Mr. Rhoades).
242
Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 489–91.
243
See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 58–63 (2004) (describing the rising
numbers of industrial accident cases in the late nineteenth century); Lerner, Directed Verdict,
supra note 117, at 489–91; Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13
MICH. L. REV. 302, 303–04 (1915) (noting that juries were hearing more complex cases than
they were previously).
244
See, e.g., Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1879) (stating that expansive
use of directed verdict “is the constant practice, and it is a convenient one. It saves time and
expense.”); Meyer v. Houck, 52 N.W. 235, 237 (Iowa 1892) (explaining that expanded use
of directed verdict “will be of material advantage in the trial of cases in the saving of the time
of the trial courts . . . and the saving of court expenses to the counties”).
245
See, e.g., Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243, 252 (1837) (explaining that the rule of drawing
jurors from the city of New Haven rather than the county avoided “a great inconvenience to
our remote citizens” because of the expense and time of travel to perform jury service).
246
See Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796–1996, 94
MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2679–84 (1996).
247
Zylstra v. Corp. of Charleston, 1 S.C.L (1 Bay) 382, 393 (S.C. 1794).
248
STATE OF NEW YORK, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND
PLEADINGS 190 (1848).
249
Id. (“If that burthen can be lessened, by the plan proposed [of providing for waiver of
civil jury trial], without in any way infringing upon the rights of parties, we shall regard it as
a great benefit.”).
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to jurors. Members of state constitutional conventions frequently mentioned the
burden of jury service in arguing for permitting waiver of jury trial, reduction in the
number of jurors, or majority verdicts.250 Even supporters of the traditional jury admitted that jury service was “an onerous duty,” that should be relieved.251
Judges and commentators sometimes suggested—and on rare occasions, openly
stated—another problem with juries: that they might lack the ability to decide complex cases or suffer from bias. One New York judge in 1862 was forthright: Jurors, he
wrote, lack professional education and judicial experience, act in secret without individual responsibility, and are “far more liable to be swayed by passion and excitement,
and other undue influences” than judges.252 Jury verdicts are “notoriously many times
founded upon mistakes, misconceptions, and other errors,” and therefore it was necessary for judges to review verdicts with “firmness.”253 Judges were typically more circumspect in hinting at the problem. Even the U.S. Supreme Court, however, could use
strong language about the shortcomings of juries:
It is the duty of a court in its relation to the jury to protect parties
from unjust verdicts arising from ignorance of the rules of law and
of evidence, from impulse of passion or prejudice, or from any
other violation of his lawful rights in the conduct of a trial.254
Juror ignorance and passion could upend the predictable legal rules needed in a
complex commercial society. This view of the jury was far from that of the AntiFederalists.255
250

NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 64, at 111 (remarks
of Mr. Hunt) (complaining about “the present tax on jurymen’s time and patience” and arguing
for a reduction in the number); id. at 538 (remarks of Mr. Tallmadge) (expressing his belief
that “the system might be rendered less oppressive on jurors; by diminishing the number required in the trial for certain cases”); id. at 547 (remarks of Mr. Ruggles) (calling it an “abuse”
that twelve men could be called from their work, including farmers during harvest, to decide
cases worth trivial amounts); id. at 829 (remarks of Mr. Brown) (criticizing “a system that
called a man for hours or days from his ordinary means of livelihood, to sit in the jury box
and listen to the details of transactions into which the suitor entered of his own free will, and
now from a defect of his own judgment, or misplaced confidence, sought to draw upon his
neighbor’s time, and the state treasury, to restore to him compensation for the effects of the
erroneous principles in relation to credit, upon which as contrasted perhaps with his innocent
friends upon the jury panel, he conducted his business”).
251
Id. at 545 (remarks of Mr. Worden) (arguing for preserving the traditional number of
twelve but supporting the parties’ ability to waive civil jury trial).
252
Ernst v. Hudson River R.R., 24 How. Pr. 97, 105–07 (N.Y. 1862) (E. Darwin Smith, J.).
253
Id. at 106–07.
254
Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116, 121 (1874).
255
See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Antifederalists: The Loyal Opposition and the American
Constitution, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 182, 201–02 (1984) (reviewing THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)).
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Members of state constitutional conventions also expressed doubts about the
quality of jurors. In many areas, sheriffs had difficulty summoning enough jurors.
“Talesmen,” or bystanders, were frequently enlisted.256 A member of the New York
Constitutional Convention of 1846 commented on the quality of these jurors:
[V]ery many of our courts are haunted, day after day, by dissolute
loungers, waiting a chance to obtain a shilling by getting on a jury,
whose integrity and judgment no man can confide in, and who are
utterly unfit to decide either the law or the facts of any case.257
Another member of that Convention argued that because jurors were “liable to prejudice,” the traditional number of twelve was needed.258 One out of twelve, hopefully, “would not be swayed by improper feelings.”259 He agreed that parties should
be able to waive jury trial and thus avoid jury bias.260
Because of these circumstances, courts held, legislatures (and judges) should be
allowed discretion to adjust the conditions of civil jury trial.261 Legislatures and courts
seized the opportunity.
2. The Fiction of Consent to Non-Jury Procedures
In addition to giving these practical reasons for curtailing jury trials, courts developed an important justification for why it was fair for litigants to be subject to another
mode of proceeding. Particular litigants were on notice that they were so subject, and
indeed had constructively consented to these alternative procedures by engaging in
256

King, supra note 246, at 2678. The use of talesmen was common in England in the
seventeenth century, according to J.S. Cockburn. See COCKBURN, supra note 227, at 118,
141. J.M. Beattie found that in England in the eighteenth century, it was relatively easy to
assemble “sufficient men of the solid middling groups” to serve on assize juries. J.M.
BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660–1800, at 387 (1986). Finding qualified
jurors for the quarter sessions, however, was more difficult. See id. at 391–92.
257
NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 64, at 111 (remarks
of Mr. Hunt). On concerns about the integrity of talesmen in the early twentieth century, see
King, supra note 246, at 2691–92.
258
NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 64, at 544 (remarks
of Mr. Worden).
259
Id. at 544–45.
260
See id. at 545. Another delegate complained that expanded voir dire had weakened the
quality of jurors. Id. at 547 (remarks of Mr. Stow) (“[A]t present, by recent decisions, none
but knaves or fools can sit as jurors—knaves, who deny they have an opinion on the case;
or fools, so profoundly ignorant they can form no opinion about a case.”). Echoing Hamilton,
some delegates were concerned about the proposed merger of law and equity because jurors
were not capable of deciding complex cases with multiple parties. See id. at 621–22 (remarks
of Mr. Shepard); id. at 635 (remarks of Mr. Perkins); id. at 666.
261
See supra Part II.C.1.
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certain activities or assuming certain positions. These persons, courts declared, had
voluntarily submitted themselves to procedures other than jury trial and therefore
could not complain of its lack. (This argument was the opposite of the medieval fiction
that a criminal defendant had “consented” to jury trial, and therefore could not complain about the procedure or the result.262 In the middle ages, the legal system needed
a fiction to establish jury trial; in the nineteenth century, the legal system needed a
fiction to avoid it.263 )
Some summary proceedings, without juries, had traditionally been permitted.
Courts explained that summary proceedings without a jury had long been allowed for
collection of rent and for collection of taxes.264 Judicial opinions—and Alexander
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 83—explained the tax-collection exception to jury
trial as a “necessity,” to avoid delay and uncertainty in collection of revenue.265 The
government, the argument went, could not function if it had to submit the cases of
defaulting tax payers to trial by jury. There was a similar exception to jury trial to
recover government money from public officials or agents and their sureties. These
actions, usually authorized by statute, were often said to be a form of contempt of
court; the officials in question tended to be officers of the court such as sheriffs and
262

See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 27, at 61–62.
Id.
264
These proceedings were called “distress for rent” and “distress for taxes.” See, e.g.,
State v. Allen, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 55, 59–60 (1822).
265
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“As to the mode of collection in this State [New York], under our own Constitution
the trial by jury is in most cases out of use. The taxes are usually levied by the more summary
proceeding of distress and sale, as in cases of rent. And it is acknowledged on all hands that
this is essential to the efficacy of the revenue laws. The dilatory course of a trial at law to recover the taxes imposed on individuals would neither suit the exigencies of the public nor
promote the convenience of the citizens.”); see also Allen, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) at 60 (“This
[summary] method of collecting taxes is as well established by custom and usage as any principle of the common law. A similar practice prevailed in all the colonies from the first dawn
of their existence; it has been continued by all the states since their independence, and had
existed in England from time immemorial. Indeed, it is necessary to the existence of every
government, and is based upon the principle of self preservation.”); Tift v. Griffin, 5 Ga. 185,
191 (1848) (“[T]he State may collect taxes immediately, out of the defaulting citizen; for that
purpose the tax collector is authorized to issue execution. These powers of the government
are founded in an imperious necessity. They are necessary to the preservation of the government, to the administration of the law, indeed, to a maintenance of all the rights of the
people. If the government were forced to submit the case of every defaulting tax payer, and tax
gatherer, and financial agent to a jury, with the delays and uncertainties attending a judicial
investigation, it could not command its revenue, it could not be administered.”). Legislatures
extended summary proceedings to subscribers for building public buildings who failed to pay
their subscriptions. See, e.g., Ewing v. Dirs. of the Penitentiary, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 6, 7 (1805)
(holding constitutional a summary proceeding, under statute, against a subscriber for building
a penitentiary who failed to pay).
263
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court clerks.266 Blackstone declared that such summary proceedings were “as ancient
as the laws themselves” and important to prevent “among the people a disgust against
the courts themselves.”267 These traditional summary proceedings, without juries, may
have been a reason why a good deal of administrative power in the early republic was
lodged with courts.268
If avoidance of trial by jury benefited the government in collecting its revenue,
such avoidance might also benefit other litigants. Legislatures experimented with creating summary proceedings in different classes of cases. These typically gave to a
plaintiff in a particular class of cases the ability to make an affidavit before a judge or
justice of the peace, alleging that defendant owed him a sum of money.269 (There was
a requirement of a prior demand and refusal to pay.270 ) Based on the affidavit alone,
the plaintiff would obtain an order to enter judgment and to issue a writ of execution
immediately.271 The sheriff would then seize defendant’s property, and sell it.272 (Some
266

See, e.g., Wells v. Caldwell, 8 Ky. (1 A.K. Marsh.) 441, 442 (1819) (observing that,
according to “the ancient principles of the common law,” a court without a jury might order
recovery from a sheriff who failed to return an execution according to the writ, and therefore
holding that the Act of 1811 that allowed such proceedings did not violate the constitutional
right to jury trial, and calling the sheriff’s failure a “contempt”); Harrison v. Chiles, 13 Ky.
(3 Litt.) 195, 201–06 (1823) (citing Wells, 8 Ky. (1 A.K. Marsh) at 441) (holding constitutional
a summary proceeding against a court clerk for extortion in a fee bill); Murry v. Askew, 29
Ky. (6 J.J. Marsh.) 27, 27 (1831) (declaring that summary proceedings against a sheriff and his
sureties were constitutional); Lewis v. Garrett’s Adm’rs, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 434, 453, 456–
57 (1841) (Trotter, J.) (holding constitutional summary proceedings against a sheriff and his
sureties for the amount of an execution, but explaining: “And yet, I believe, the courts have
seldom refused the sheriff or his sureties a jury trial when it has been formally demanded.”);
Tift, 5 Ga. at 190, 192 (declaring that judges of the inferior courts may be subject to summary
process for holding public money); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *283 (stating
that these proceedings are according to the common law and not dependent on statutes, and
characterizing them as a civil execution for the benefit of the injured party). In 1848, the
Supreme Court of Georgia construed this exception somewhat narrowly and required a jury
trial for the executor of a deceased inferior court judge who allegedly possessed public money.
Tift, 5 Ga. at 193.
267
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *284, *286.
268
Early Congresses assigned a variety of administrative functions to federal and state
courts. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 73–75 (2012).
269
See, e.g., Act of the Assembly of Maryland, 1793, ch. 30, § 14 (providing for summary
proceedings for a bank to recover from its debtors); Tennessee Act of Nov. 15, 1821 (providing for summary proceedings for creditors of two banks to recover money owed); Georgia
Pamphlet Laws of 1841, at 167–68 (providing for summary proceedings for employees on
steamboats or watercraft on certain rivers against the owners of the vessel for wages and provisions owed).
270
See Act of the Assembly of Maryland, 1793, ch. 30, § 14; Flint River, 5 Ga. at 198.
271
See Act of the Assembly of Maryland, 1793, ch. 30, § 14; Flint River, 5 Ga. at 198
(quoting 1841 Ga. Laws 167).
272
Act of the Assembly of Maryland, 1793, ch. 30, § 14.

2014] FAILURE OF ORIGINALISM IN PRESERVING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

853

statutes required first advertising a sale.273 ) The defendant had the option of filing an
affidavit denying the money was due, or some part of it.274 Some statutes specified that
in order to get his property returned, and to obtain a jury trial, the defendant had to pay
in full the amount admitted to be due.275 In addition, defendant had to give bond and
security for the remaining amount alleged (and sometimes double the amount), together with any costs.276 These requirements were significant obstacles to jury trial.
Courts held that, despite the impossibility or difficulty of obtaining jury trials,
litigants had in effect consented to the summary proceedings because of their actions
by, for example, owning steamboats operating on certain rivers,277 or making a note
payable at a particular bank.278 The U.S. Supreme Court in 1819 was one of the most
emphatic on this point:
And it was with a view to the voluntary acquiescence of the individual, nay, the solicited submission to the law of the contract,
that this remedy was given. By making the note negotiable at the
Bank of Columbia, the debtor chose his own jurisdiction; in consideration of the credit given him, he voluntarily relinquished his
claims to the ordinary administration of justice, and placed himself only in the situation of an hypothecator of goods, with power
to sell on default, or a stipulator in the admiralty, whose voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of that Court subjects him to
personal coercion.279
The Anti-Federalist nightmare about debtors was coming true, less than three
decades after the ratification of the Seventh Amendment.
Legislatures tended to create such procedures for businesses invested with special
public interest, and involving cases in which it was difficult for plaintiffs to sue, or
defendants often resisted proper demands for payment, or prompt payment of debts
was a necessity for carrying on business. For example, in 1841 the Georgia legislature
created a summary process for employees on steamboats and watercraft on certain
rivers for payment of wages and provisions against the owners of the vessels.280 The
273

See Flint River, 5 Ga. at 198.
See id. at 199.
275
See, e.g., id.
276
Id. (double the amount alleged to be due).
277
Id. at 216 (“So here it may be said, that every agreement made respecting service in the
navigation of the particular streams named in the acts, in [sic] a voluntary submission by the
owners of the steamboats or other water-craft to the law of the contract, and acquiescence in
the remedy which it gives.”).
278
See Bank of Columbia v. Ross, 4 H. & McH. 456, 464 (Md. 1799) (“[H]e must have
consented in writing that the same be made negotiable at the bank.”).
279
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 243 (1819).
280
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 198 (citing Georgia Pamphlet Laws of 1841, at 167–68) (providing
for summary proceedings of employees on steamboats or watercraft on certain rivers against
274
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Supreme Court of Georgia, per Chief Justice Lumpkin, explained that steamboats on
those rivers were “notoriously” owned by persons who lived abroad, and thus were not
subject to ordinary process of law.281 (The Court observed that, however, the owners’
agents were generally present and could defend against summary proceedings.282 )
Lumpkin displayed his interest in economic development by highlighting the importance of summary proceedings in these cases to the interests of both agriculture and
commerce.283 He declared, rather dramatically, that “[w]ithout some such provision, our
internal streams, the great arteries of trade and transportation, would be abandoned.”284
Presumably, he meant that persons would be reluctant to work on boats without a
guaranty of wages being paid. Legislatures and courts demonstrated concern that contracts between employers and employees in such enterprises be enforced quickly and
efficiently, thus smoothing relations and fostering development.
Another class of cases for which legislatures provided summary proceedings involved banks.285 The importance of maintaining a functioning credit system was evident to many; courts called banks institutions of “public utility.”286 Both legislatures
and courts perceived jury trial as a hindrance to these public utilities.287 Legislatures
provided summary proceedings for banks to use against their debtors,288 and for creditors to use against banks.289 The preamble of a 1793 Maryland statute creating a summary proceeding for a bank to use against its defaulting debtors explained: “[I]t is
absolutely necessary that the debts due to the said bank should be punctually paid, to
enable the directors to calculate with certainty and precision on meeting the demands
that may be made upon them.”290 Courts repeated this point in upholding these provisions against attack on constitutional grounds.291 The Supreme Court of the United
the owners of the vessel for wages and provisions owed). In 1845, the Georgia Legislature
expanded the use of summary proceedings in the 1841 act. See Flint River, 5 Ga. at 199–200.
281
Flint River, 5 Ga. at 212.
282
Id.
283
Id. at 217.
284
Id.
285
On the use of summary proceedings in cases involving banks, particularly in the Southern
states in the early nineteenth century, see Robert Wyness Millar, Three American Ventures in
Summary Civil Procedure, 38 YALE L.J. 193, 213–15 (1928) [hereinafter Millar, Summary
Civil Procedure].
286
Bank of Columbia v. Ross, 4 H. & McH. 456, 464 (Md. 1799); see also Vanzant v.
Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 259, 266 (1829) (calling two banks “public institutions” and observing that their charters were public laws).
287
See, e.g., Act of the Assembly of Maryland, 1793, ch. 30, § 14; Bank of Columbia v.
Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 243 (1819); Bank of Columbia v. Ross, 4 H. & McH. 456,
464 (Md. 1799).
288
Act of the Assembly of Maryland, 1793, ch. 30, § 14; see Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
at 241; Ross, 4 H. & McH. at 464.
289
Tennessee Act of Nov. 15, 1821; see Vanzant, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 263.
290
Act of the Assembly of Maryland, 1793, ch. 30, § 14.
291
See, e.g., Ross, 4 H. & McH. at 464 (Chase, C.J.). Similarly, Judge Peck of the Tennessee
Supreme Court explained that the summary proceedings at issue for use by creditors against
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States seemed quite certain of its decision to uphold summary proceedings by a bank;
it stopped the arguments of one counsel against constitutionality before he began.292
Calling the question “one of the deepest interest,”293 the Court issued its decision, holding that the right to jury trial had not been violated, five days after argument.294 So successful was this type of summary proceeding that the Virginia legislature, in its Code
of 1849, provided for such summary proceedings in all actions for money damages
based on a contract.295
In short, when efficiency was valued, the jury was limited. Anti-Federalists had agitated for the Seventh Amendment precisely to require juries in cases against debtors.296
In less than three decades the U.S. Supreme Court unhesitatingly held that certain debtors could get a jury only on appeal, with all of the attendant restrictions and expense.
The Anti-Federalist vision of the civil jury as a law-nullifying institution was rapidly
fading. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 drastically expanded this type of summary proceeding, and the English version, to create the summary judgment provision of Rule 56(a).297 Rule 56(a) eliminated any possibility of
getting a jury in certain cases.
3. Making a Jury Demand More Expensive: Jury Fees and Diversion to
Non-Jury Proceedings with an Appeal to a Jury
Another way that legislatures might limit the availability of jury trials was to make
a jury demand more expensive. This could be done directly, through increasing jury
fees. A more subtle method, favored by legislatures, was to force a litigant into a nonjury proceeding—such as the court of a justice of the peace or a summary proceeding—
and then to provide a jury on appeal, but at much greater cost than obtaining a jury
banks aimed to repair “such defects in the existing remedies as the bank had laid hold of to
evade the payment of her notes.” Vanzant, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 265.
292
Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 240 (“Martin, contra, was stopped by the Court.”).
293
Id. (Johnson, J.).
294
Oral argument occurred on February 17, 1819, and the Court delivered its opinion on
February 22. Id. at 238, 240.
295
VA. CODE ch. 167, § 5 (1849). The revisers who drafted the Code reported to the
Virginia legislature:
Seeing that this mode of proceeding has worked well in the cases in
which it has been heretofore allowed, it seems to use advisable to extend it to all cases in which a person is now entitled to recover money
by action on a contract. We do not propose to take away the right of
bringing an action from any person; we propose merely, when his claim
to money is on a contract, to allow him to use, if he please, the more
simple remedy by motion, instead of an action.
Wilson v. Dawson, 32 S.E. 461, 462 (1899) (quoting the Report of Revisers); see also Millar,
Summary Civil Procedure, supra note 285, at 216–17.
296
See supra notes 85–104 and accompanying text.
297
FED R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Langbein, supra note 10, at 566–67.
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in the first instance. Courts readily approved of these schemes and rejected arguments
that they were unconstitutional.
Jury fees were a burden on jury trial that courts routinely upheld. Jurisdictions
usually required prepayment of jury fees in order for a party to have a civil jury.298
Courts strictly construed these requirements. Litigants’ claims of indigence often made
no difference.299 Failure to pay the jury fees would result in a bench trial and decision
by the court.300 Some litigants claimed that the requirement of prepayment of jury fees
violated constitutional rights to trial by jury.301 Courts briskly rejected that argument.302
In 1862, the Minnesota Supreme Court remarked that the prepayment of jury fees
seemed no more liable to constitutional objection than the prepayment of many other
fees, including those of the clerk, sheriff, and other officers of the court.303 To hold
jury fees unconstitutional would be to require litigation “without price” and would
mean “an end to all fees, from the issuing of the summons to the entry of satisfaction
of the judgment.”304 “Reasonable” fees were permitted.305
298

See, e.g., Adams v. Corriston, 7 Minn. 456, 457 (1862); Randall v. Keilor, 60 Me. 37,
38, 44 (1872).
299
See, e.g., Randall, 60 Me. at 38, 44 (defendant demanded a jury trial as a constitutional
right without paying the seven-dollar jury fee required by statute, stating he had “no money”).
For an argument that the Due Process Clause, and access-to-court provisions of state constitutions, require that court fees be waived for poor litigants, see John Leubsdorf, Constitutional
Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 632–33 (1984).
300
See, e.g., Adams, 7 Minn. at 457. Normally the plaintiff paid the jury fees, but sometimes
defendants had to pay to get a jury. Id.
301
See, e.g., Adams, 7 Minn. at 457; Randall, 60 Me. at 40.
302
See Adams, 7 Minn. at 461–62; Randall, 60 Me. at 44 (“[T]he prepayment of a jury fee
by the plaintiff has never been deemed an infringement upon the right to a trial by jury. Nor
can the prepayment by the defendant be so regarded, when it is made at his own option, and
followed by the same consequences as when paid by the plaintiff.”); id. at 45 (“Declining to
make the required payment, the defendant must be held as waiving the right to a jury trial, when
he refuses to do what is an essential and reasonable prerequisite to its enjoyment.”). In Maine,
jury fees were repealed in 1873. See Pub. Laws 1873, ch. 123.
303
Adams, 7 Minn. at 461 (“The objection to the jury fee, we do not think is well taken. It
is altogether too broad. It is not that the fee is so unreasonably high as to impede the due administration of justice, but because a fee is charged at all. We can see no valid objection to
a reasonable fee of this kind. The constitution does not guarantee to the citizen the right to
litigate without expense, but simply protects him from the imposition of such terms as unreasonably and injuriously interfere with his right to a remedy in the law, or impede the due
administration of justice.”).
304
Id. at 462.
305
Id. at 461. In rare circumstances, a court might hold that a jury fee was unreasonable.
See La Bowe v. Balthazor, 193 N.W. 244, 245–46 (1923) (holding unreasonable a twentyfour dollar fee in municipal court with a jurisdiction not exceeding $1,000). Courts almost
always found jury fees to be reasonable. See Note, Constitutionality of Statute Requiring
Party Demanding Jury to Pay Jury Fees or Charges Incidental to Summoning or Impaneling
of Jurors, 32 A.L.R. 865 (1924), superseded by Michael R. Flaherty, Validity of Law or Rule
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The issue of making jury trial more expensive arose often in the context of expanding the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. Because of the many advantages of
avoiding jury trial, legislatures were eager to raise the amount in controversy limit for
justices of the peace. In raising these limits, legislatures sometimes remarked that “the
value of money hath greatly lessened,”306 but courts rarely mentioned inflation.307
Instead, courts focused on the question of appeal. In expanding the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, many legislatures in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century took care to provide an appeal to a court that sat with a jury.308 If such an appeal
was provided, courts universally approved the expansion of jurisdiction of justices
of the peace.309
Requiring State Court Party Who Requests Jury Trial in Civil Case to Pay Costs Associated
with Jury, 68 A.L.R. 4th 343 (1989).
306
See Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 427 (Pa. 1808) (Brackenridge, J.) (quoting Pennsylvania Act of Apr. 5, 1785, preamble).
307
A rare example is Curtis v. Gill, 34 Conn. 49, 55 (1867) (addressing a statute expanding the jurisdiction of justices of the peace) (“So long as the legislature keeps substantially
within the limits prescribed to itself by long usage, taking into consideration the relative
description in the value of money and the altered condition of the business interests of the
state, we have no disposition to interfere by way of judicial veto.”).
308
See, e.g., Emerick, 1 Binn. 416 (addressing the constitutionality of Pennsylvania Act
of Apr. 19, 1794, which increased the jurisdiction of justices of the peace from a limit of ten
pounds to twenty pounds, and providing an appeal for litigants if the judgment exceeded five
pounds to a court with a jury); Beers v. Beers, 4 Conn. 535 (1823) (addressing the constitutionality of Connecticut Act of May, 1821, codified at Revised Statutes tit. 2, § 23, which
increased the jurisdiction of justices of the peace from a limit of fifteen dollars to thirty-five
dollars, and providing an appeal for litigants if the alleged damages exceeded seven dollars to
a court with a jury). Georgia had a tradition of specifying the amount in controversy limit for
justices of the peace in its constitution. See GA. CONST. of 1798, art. III, § 5 (providing for
election of justices of the peace and setting the limit of their jurisdiction at thirty dollars); GA.
CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 6, cl. 2 (setting the limit of jurisdiction for justices of the peace at
one hundred dollars). The Georgia Constitution of 1868 further provided that if the sum
claimed before a justice of the peace was more than fifty dollars, a party could appeal to the
superior court, which sat with a jury. Id. On the continuing importance of appeal to a common law court to politicians and trial lawyers in the administrative state of the early twentieth
century, see DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: AMERICANS CONFRONT THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 2, 6–7 (forthcoming Oxford University Press).
309
See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 43 (1899) (“For half a century and more . . .
after the adoption of the earliest constitutions of the several States, their courts uniformly
maintained the constitutionality of statutes more than doubling the pecuniary limit of the civil
jurisdiction of justices of the peace as it stood before the adoption of constitutions declaring
that trial by jury should be preserved inviolate, although those statutes made no provision for
a trial by jury, except upon appeal from the judgment of the justice of the peace, and upon
giving bond with surety to pay the judgment of the appellate court.”); id. at 23 (“A long line
of judicial decisions in the several States, beginning early in this century, maintains the position
that the constitutional right of trial by jury in civil actions is not infringed by a statute which
sets the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in actions at law higher than
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Obtaining a jury on appeal, however, was often much more expensive than getting
a jury in the first instance. The added expense could be a serious deterrent to use of the
jury. Counsel in a North Carolina case in 1811 remarked that the jurisdiction of justices
of the peace in that state had been steadily increased from 1774 to 1802. He argued
that unless the judiciary imposed a strict limit on the legislature, the jurisdiction of the
justices of the peace “may eventually swallow up the jurisdiction of our Courts of
Justice.”310 True, counsel observed, an appeal was provided, but the appeal was “so
clogged with difficulties that few can enforce it,” because of the requirement of an
appeal bond.311 Counsel complained that the justices of the peace were becoming “an
aristocracy of the most odious kind,” and urged the court to protect the citizen from
the legislature with “the shield of the Constitution.”312 His and similar arguments
failed.313 Despite the added barrier to jury trial—which typically included requirements to post an appeal bond as well as to pay jury fees—courts found no violation
of constitutional rights.314 Legislatures were to have discretion to design a court
it was when the particular constitution was adopted . . . .”); id. at 45–46 (holding that, under
the Seventh Amendment, Congress may extend the limit of jurisdiction of justices of the peace,
as long as an appeal to a court with a common law jury is provided if the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars); see also Emerick, 1 Binn. at 424 (Yeates, J.) (“[I]t must be
admitted that the right of trial by jury is not taken away, though the party may be subjected
to some inconvenience in making his election.”); Keddie v. Moore, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 41, 45
(1811) (“So long as the trial by Jury is preserved through an appeal, the preliminary mode of
obtaining it may be varied at the will and pleasure of the Legislature.”); Pollard v. Holeman,
7 Ky. (4 Bibb.) 416, 417 (1816); Wilson v. Simonton, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 482 (1821) (following
Keddie v. Moore and holding constitutional an expansion of the jurisdiction of justices of the
peace to one hundred dollars); Morford v. Barnes, 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 444, 445–47 (1835)
(following the unreported case of Stephens v. Henderson, holding constitutional an expansion
of the jurisdiction of justices of the peace because an appeal was provided to a court that sat
with a jury); Hapgood v. Doherty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 373, 374 (1857) (“It is a sufficient answer
to the constitutional objection, that a trial by jury is secured to the defendant on appeal.”).
310
Keddie, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) at 42 (argument of Jocelyn for the defendant).
311
Id. at 43.
312
Id.
313
See id. at 45 (“The Court . . . cannot view this as a case which will warrant the
Judiciary to exercise an act of such paramount and delicate authority as to interfere with the
act of the Legislature.”).
314
See, e.g., Emerick, 1 Binn. at 416 (requirement of an appeal bond); Keddie, 6 N.C. (2
Mur.) at 45 (requirement of an appeal bond) (“The party wishing to appeal may be subjected
to some inconvenience in getting security, but this inconvenience does not in this, nor in any
other case where security is required, amount to a denial of right.”); Morford, 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.)
at 446 (holding that the legislature could determine the security required for appeal, and the
act was not unconstitutional because the security required for appeal was greater than in cases
in which the party was brought into the court by original writ); People v. Hoffman, 3 Mich.
248, 251 (1854) (holding that in a civil action for debt, legislature could require payment of
jury fees before appeal from a justice of the peace to a court that sat with a jury); Adams v.
Corriston, 7 Minn. 456, 456, 461–62 (1862) (holding that the legislature could require payment
of jury fees before appeal from a justice of the peace to a court that sat with a jury).
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system,315 assuming they nominally provided certain safeguards such as an appeal
to a jury. (Courts also relied on this argument in expanding the subject matter jurisdiction of justices of the peace.316 ) Providing an appeal to a jury from justices of the
peace, however, sometimes proved to be a stage en route to expanding the final, unappealable, jurisdiction.317 Courts acquiesced in each step along the way, gradually
allowing the jury right to erode.
The framers of the Illinois Constitution of 1848 tried to halt the continuing growth
of the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, so prevalent in other states. In a rare move,
that Constitution expanded the reach of civil jury trial, and provided: “That the right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; and shall extend to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in controversy.”318 A few other states copied this provision.319 The
Illinois provision only lasted just over twenty years; Illinois removed the provision
from its constitution in 1870.320
Legislatures also used this device of providing an expensive appeal to a jury in
creating new summary proceedings. Just as in cases involving justices of the peace,
defendants subject to these summary proceedings argued that the jury right was “so
clogged by restrictions” that it amount to a denial.321 Courts responded that although the
315

See, e.g., Keddie, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) at 44 (“When the Convention declared that the
ancient mode of trial by Jury should be preserved, no restriction was thereby laid on the
Legislature as to erecting or organizing judicial tribunals, in such manner as might be most
conducive to the public convenience and interest, on a change of circumstances affected by a
variety of causes.”); id. at 45 (“So long as the trial by Jury is preserved through an appeal, the
preliminary mode of obtaining it may be varied at the will and pleasure of the Legislature.”);
Head v. Hughes, 8 Ky. (1 A.K. Marsh) 372, 373 (1818) (“[T]he apportionment of [the judicial]
power, and its regulation from time to time among those tribunals . . . is the mere subject of
expediency, which belongs exclusively to the sphere of legislation.”).
316
In assessing the value of private property taken for public use, states sometimes followed
a procedure of having a justice of the peace convene a panel of assessors. So long as an appeal
to a court that sat with a jury was permitted, this procedure was held to be constitutional. See
Steuart v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Md. 500, 512 (1855) (“[W]here a law secures the trial by jury
upon an appeal, it is no violation of a constitutional provision for guarding that right, although
such law may provide for a primary trial without the intervention of a jury.”); Norristown
Turnpike Co. v. Burket, 26 Ind. 53, 62–63 (1866). The Pennsylvania legislature in 1863
likewise expanded the subject matter jurisdiction of justices of the peace to landlord-tenant
disputes and provided for an appeal to a court that sat with a jury. See Haines v. Levin, 51
Pa. 412, 414–16 (1866) (upholding the constitutionality of the act because it provided for an
appeal to a court with a jury).
317
See, e.g., Guile v. Brown, 38 Conn. 237, 240–41 (1871) (upholding against constitutional
challenge an expansion of the final, unappealable jurisdiction of justices of the peace).
318
ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 6.
319
See, e.g., MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 4 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy . . . .”);
ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 6 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate and shall
extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy . . . .”).
320
See ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 5.
321
Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 208 (1848).
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burden on the defendant might be “onerous,” that was a question for the legislature.322
Restrictions on jury trial were not an absolute denial.323 Jury trial was still possible for
the litigants, at least theoretically.324
4. Waiver of Jury Trial
American courts, legislatures, and even constitutional conventions were aggressive
in trying to avoid jury trial another way: by providing for waiver. In England, in the
common law courts, jury trial could not be waived in favor of bench trial.325 This was
true until the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 provided for waiver.326 English
judges so dominated jury verdicts in civil cases, through their power to comment on
the evidence and the respect in which they were held, that this change hardly made a
difference to the outcome of civil cases.327 Avoiding jury trial did, however, result in
savings of time and money.328 In the nineteenth century in England, a complex commercial society, the civil jury had become simply a wasteful nuisance.329
In the United States, several jurisdictions provided for waiver of civil jury trial
earlier than in England. Some states included in their constitutions express provisions
permitting waiver of civil jury trial.330 New York was one of the first states to alter its
jury trial right, in 1846.331 The New York Constitution of that year added explicit permission for the legislature to provide for waiver of civil jury trial: “The trial by jury
in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever; but a
322

Id.
Id. Chief Justice Lumpkin delicately suggested to the Georgia legislature that it might
consider amending the act to waive the bond requirement in cases in which the defendant gave
an affidavit of poverty. Id. That shortcoming, however, did not prevent him from declaring the
act to be constitutional. Id. at 208–09; see also Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
235, 243 (1819) (observing that the act in question did not produce “a total prostration of the
trial by jury” and did not even involve “the defendant in circumstances which rendered that
right unavailing for his protection”).
324
See Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 259, 264–65 (1829); Bank of Columbia v. Ross,
4 H. & McH. 456, 464 (Md. 1799); Flint River, 5 Ga. at 208; Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 243.
325
At least, this was true for questions of liability. Questions of damages were somewhat
different. See OLDHAM, supra note 25, at 45–56. The County Courts Act of 1846 provided
for waiver of jury trial in the new county courts, and few litigants in those courts proved to want
a jury. See PATRICK POLDEN, A HISTORY OF THE COUNTY COURT, 1846–1971, at 46–47 (1999);
Hanly, supra note 156, at 261–62.
326
Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125, § 1 (U.K.) (providing that a
judge could decide issues of fact, if the parties consented in writing and if the court believed
it was appropriate to do so); see Hanly, supra note 156, at 277.
327
See Hanly, supra note 156, at 275–78.
328
See, e.g., id. at 278.
329
See id. at 259–62 (discussing the increasing hostility toward the civil jury).
330
See, e.g., supra note 58.
331
N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 2.
323
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jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed
by law.”332 A delegate to the New York Constitutional Convention of 1846 commented
that waiver of civil jury trial in certain cases was already permitted by statute.333 Other
delegates repeatedly emphasized the costs of jury trial to the county treasuries and to
the jurors themselves.334 A few also suggested the problem of juror bias.335 Many other
states followed New York in modifying their constitutional provisions explicitly to
permit the parties to waive civil jury trial.336
The Federal Constitution and some state constitutions, however, did not explicitly
permit waiver of civil jury trial. American courts in the nineteenth century nevertheless
held that civil jury trial was a right that could be waived.337 In a case in 1841 before
the Mississippi High Court of Errors and Appeals, counsel “very forcibly urged” that
under the state constitution civil jury trial could not be waived either expressly or
impliedly.338 In a widely cited opinion, Judge James Trotter decisively rejected that
argument.339 In so doing, the judge paid the ritual homage to the jury:
We cannot consent to this interpretation of the bill of rights [of
Mississippi]. The right it secures to the citizen is one which is
justly regarded as one of the strongest bulwarks of human rights,
332

Id.
NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 64, at 544–45 (remarks
of Mr. Worden). The delegate remarked, “Judicious counsel always advise this course [of
waiver].” Id. at 544.
334
See supra text accompanying notes 64–66; see also supra Parts I.A & I.C.1.
335
See supra text accompanying notes 252–55; see also Part I.C.1.
336
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 3 (“The right of trial by jury shall be secured to
all, and remain inviolate forever; but a trial by jury may be waived by the parties in all civil
cases, in the manner to be prescribed by law.”); MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 4 (“The right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the
amount in controversy, but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner
prescribed by law.”) ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 6 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy; but
a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases, in the manner prescribed by law.”); FLA.
CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 4 (“The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever; but in all civil cases a jury-trial may be waived by the parties in the manner to
be prescribed by law.”); MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 23 (“The right of trial by jury shall
be secured to all, and shall remain inviolate, but in all civil cases and in all criminal cases not
amounting to a felony, upon default of appearance or by consent of the parties expressed in
such manner as the law may prescribe, a trial by jury may be waived, or a trial had by any less
number of jurors than the number provided by law.”).
337
See, e.g., Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 243–44 (1819); Lewis v.
Garrett’s Adm’rs, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 434, 457 (1841); Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster,
5 Ga. 194, 208 (1848).
338
Lewis, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) at 457.
339
Id.
333
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and is held dear by the people of this country. Still it must be
considered a privilege which he may waive in any case he may
choose. To hold otherwise, would be to restrain the liberty and
privileges of the citizen, and not to enlarge them.340
The right of civil jury trial was therefore a protection belonging to a party, and not
a good in itself. For this proposition, Judge Trotter cited an influential 1819 opinion
of the U.S. Supreme Court, interpreting the Seventh Amendment to permit waiver.341
The contrast in the way courts treated waiver of civil jury trial and waiver of criminal jury trial is instructive. Courts, interpreting constitutional rights to criminal jury
trial, typically refused to permit waiver of jury trial in favor of bench trial in serious
criminal cases.342 A treatise writer summarized the reason: “[I]t is deemed, in such
cases, there are more than personal interests involved, that the rights and interests of
the public are also concerned.”343 Criminal jury trial, allowing laypersons to decide
serious criminal cases, was a public good, apart from any advantage to the defendant.344
Civil jury trial, in the view of the courts, was not a public good apart from the interests
of the parties.
In civil cases, either the text of state constitutions or judicial decisions gave legislatures power to establish the requirements for waiver of jury trial. Legislatures adopted
340

Id. Judge Trotter went on to declare:
The bill of rights says, that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.
It was not designed by this, to force a jury trial upon the party whether
he wished it or not. It is then not the trial, but the right of trial by jury
which is rendered inviolate.

Id.
341

Id. (citing Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 243–44). In Okely, Justice William Johnson
observed that
if the defendant does not avail himself of the right given him, of having
an issue made up, and the trial by jury, which is tendered to him by the
act, it is presumable that he cannot dispute the justice of the claim. That
this view of the subject is giving full effect to the seventh amendment of
the constitution, is not only deducible from the general intent, but from
the express wording of the article referred to. Had the terms been, that
“the trial by jury shall be preserved,” it might have been contended, that
they were imperative, and could not be dispensed with. But the words
are, that the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, which places it on
the foot of a lex pro se introducta, and the benefit of it may therefore
be relinquished.
Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 243–44.
342
See, e.g., Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 137 (1858); Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351,
355–58 (1868).
343
PROFFATT, supra note 179, at 157.
344
See John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 261, 269–70 (1979) (explaining that a criminal jury trial, as opposed to civil,
was considered a public good).
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various requirements, some providing that a party could have a civil jury unless the
party affirmatively waived the right,345 others that a party had to affirmatively request
a jury trial.346 Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, legislatures shifted the default, with more requiring that a party affirmatively demand a jury
trial.347 Courts upheld all these statutes, as long as the conditions for waiver were
“reasonable,” which courts routinely found.348 Jury trial became more difficult to get,
and easier to bypass.
5. Original Legal Categories: The Line Between Fact and Law
Courts used a different rationale for developing and upholding expanded methods
of jury control, such as directed verdict, compulsory nonsuit, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Courts relied on the old common law maxim, stated by Coke and
others, that the facts were for the jury to decide, the law for the judge.349 Courts conveniently ignored the problem that judges had been busy expanding the realm of law
at the expense of fact since the beginning of the republic. By invoking these original
legal categories, courts claimed to be preserving the province of the jury. The content
of those categories, however, had radically changed.
Before examining this argument in more detail, it is important to understand a
change in attitudes toward juries. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in
the United States, the political power of civil juries once again became salient.350 Just
345

The most important of these statutes was the provision concerning waiver of jury trial in
New York’s Field Code of 1848, which was copied in other states. See 1848 N.Y. Laws 538.
The Field Code provided for waiver of jury trial in the following circumstances: “(1) By
written consent [of the parties] filed with the clerk of the court; (2) By oral consent in open
court, entered in the minutes; or (3) By failure to appear at the trial.” Id. States that copied this
provision included Indiana. 1852 Ind. 2 R.S. 115, § 340. Fleming James described the various
practical difficulties that these requirements for waiver created. Fleming James, Jr., Right to
a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 665–66 (1963). An Indiana case illustrates
some of the problems that could arise. A court referred a case to a referee for trial without any
of the parties objecting. Shaw v. Kent, 11 Ind. 80 (1858). The referee then made findings and
judgment was entered accordingly. Id. Nevertheless, because no written consent to waiver of
jury trial appeared in the record, the Supreme Court of Indiana subsequently ordered the case
to go to jury trial. Id. at 82.
346
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 1772 (1851); Act of 1871, c. 57, § 38, 1871 Va. Acts 53; Act of
1879, §29, 1879 Conn. Spec. Acts 156; FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d), 39(b).
347
See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 261 (1952). Compare supra note 345, with supra note 346.
348
See, e.g., McKay v. Fair Haven & W.R. Co., 54 A. 923, 924 (Conn. 1903); Bennett v.
Hillman, 174 P. 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1918); see also Fleming James, Jr., Trial by Jury and the
New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 1022, 1024–25 (1936).
349
3 SIR EDWARD COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR,
A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 460 (J.H. Thomas ed., 1818) (1628).
350
See Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 487–88, 498–99.
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as debt cases were an intense political issue at the founding of the nation, personal
injury cases against railroads and other industrial corporations generated sharp political conflict in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.351 Judges often viewed
juries as biased against railroads and other corporations in personal injury cases, to the
point that economic prosperity might be threatened.352 As I have explained in detail
in another article, these concerns helped drive judges to develop more powerful means
of jury control.353 In contrast, popular sentiment arose to limit these methods of control and to allow juries to award damages to plaintiffs.354 (The political importance of
juries began to recede again in the 1920s with the advent of administrative schemes
for workers’ compensation and the widespread use of the automobile.355 Automobile
accident cases rapidly filled courts’ dockets and generated much less political conflict than railroad or other industrial accident cases.356 ) Besides the perceived problem
of jury bias, courts were concerned about the growing number of complicated negligence cases for personal injuries on their dockets.357 Docket pressure grew greater than
ever, and the main traditional method of jury control—new trial—began to seem far
too expensive.358
Federal and state courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth century therefore
vigorously expanded the use of directed verdict and other means of taking a case from
a jury.359 If there was no significant dispute over an issue of fact, courts held, a judge
could require the jury to bring in a particular verdict.360 Many state courts, following
the lead of the federal courts, held that a trial court could, and should, direct a verdict
if it would award a new trial for insufficient evidence if the jury brought in the opposite
verdict.361 In addition, many state legislatures gave courts authority to enter judgment
notwithstanding the verdict based on the evidence.362 These procedures greatly extended courts’ power over jury verdicts. This was particularly true because courts constantly converted issues which had been questions of fact for the jury into questions

351

See id. at 478–84, 497–505.
Id. at 478–89.
353
Id.
354
Id. at 505–06. The most dramatic examples of this backlash against directed verdict
occurred in Oklahoma and Arizona, which both ratified constitutional provisions to prevent
the procedure in negligence cases. See OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. XXIII, § 6; ARIZ. CONST.
art. XVIII, § 5 (“The defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all
cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall, at all times, be left to the jury.”).
355
Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 522–23.
356
Id.
357
Id. at 453, 474.
358
Id. at 489–90.
359
Id. at 473–75, 488–93.
360
Id. at 467–68.
361
See, e.g., id. at 489–93.
362
Id. at 516–17.
352
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of law for the judge.363 Some examples of this trend include the development of the
doctrines of contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule, as well as the general
proposition that sufficiency of the evidence was a question of law.364
Given the significance of these changes, it is surprising to a modern lawyer how
seldom courts addressed in depth the constitutional validity of the new procedures
for jury control. In deciding questions about procedures for jury control, courts almost
never engaged in extended discussions of the text and history of particular constitutional rights to jury trial. Indeed, in their opinions courts rarely even cited a particular
constitutional provision or quoted the text. Instead, courts simply declared that “[t]he
jury have nothing to do with the relevancy and materiality of evidence, or with inferences of law from facts fully established.”365 Courts then proceeded to tailor the procedure in question according to the legal traditions of the jurisdiction, the practices
of other jurisdictions, and the circumstances of the time, such as docket pressure and
jury bias.366 Judges seemed unconcerned with the shift in the line between law and
fact; it was the existence of the categories that mattered. In the 1890s, as political
tensions built concerning personal injury cases against railroads, a few constitutional
challenges to procedures taking a case from a jury were more insistent and detailed.367
But in these cases, also, courts continued to adhere to the standard reasoning: “If there
363

Scholars who have addressed this change include WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE AMERILAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS
SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 165–72 (2d ed. 1994); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 183–89 (1898); Lerner, Directed Verdict,
supra note 117, at 486–95; Lettow, New Trial, supra note 106, at 542–47; Sward, supra note
24, at 592–94, 631–32; and Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact
Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1868–71 (1966).
364
See Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 486–95.
365
Naugatuck R.R. v. Waterbury Button Co., 24 Conn. 468, 470 (1856); see also Wheeler
v. Schroeder, 4 R.I. 383, 392–93 (1856) (“The legal sufficiency of proof, and the moral weight
of legally sufficient proof, are very distinct in legal idea. The first lies within the province of
the court, the last within the province of the jury.”).
366
See, e.g., Meyer v. Houck, 52 N.W. 235, 236–37 (Iowa 1892).
367
See, e.g., Catlett v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry., 21 S.W. 1062 (Ark. 1893)
(regarding a suit for negligence against a railroad because a boy was injured by swinging on
the ladder of a moving train while playing). The court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant in that case. Id. at 1063. Hopkins v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway, 34
S.W. 1029 (Tenn. 1896), concerned the application of the fellow servant rule to the death of
a fireman working on a train. The defendant railroad was so desperate to keep the case from
a jury that it sought to revive the practice of demurrer to the evidence, a procedure last used
in Tennessee, as far as the state Supreme Court could tell, in 1818. Id. at 1038. On appeal, the
plaintiff challenged the use of demurrer as violating the Tennessee constitutional right to jury
trial. Id. at 1031. The court upheld the procedure as constitutional and appropriately sustained
in that case. Id. at 1039. The Court’s encyclopedic opinion was widely cited for its extraordinarily long and detailed analysis, aided by the diligent research of counsel for the railroad,
see id. at 1033, of different states’ constitutional rights to civil jury trial and procedures for
taking cases from juries; see id. at 1033–35.
CANIZATION OF THE COMMON
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is no evidence to sustain an issue of fact, the judge only declares the law when he tells
the jury so.”368
In a few cases, courts referred to jury practices at the time of a constitution’s
framing.369 This type of historical argument was decidedly secondary, made to back
up the main argument, which was about the division of fact and law between jury and
judge. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its many nineteenth-century decisions approving
expanded use of directed verdict, never even referred to an originalist test under the
Seventh Amendment or considered the procedure’s constitutionality in any detail.370
Courts used this style of constitutional interpretation for the issue of taking a case
from a jury partly because courts believed they had particular authority over this
question of procedure.371 Courts were emphatic that the ability to decide on the legal
sufficiency of the evidence was a necessary attribute of judicial power.372 Indeed, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting directed verdict was unconstitutional as an improper infringement of judicial power.373 Directed verdict was an
entirely judicially developed procedure, and it was apparent that the courts would not
readily declare their own creation to have been all along a constitutional violation.374
Through the end of the nineteenth century, most legal commentators tended to
applaud courts’ increasing power over jury verdicts.375 In the early twentieth century,
however, legal commentators started to question whether courts had not assumed too
much control over juries to be desirable and consistent with constitutional rights. Although many legal writers supported ever-greater judicial control over juries,376 a strand
of dissent was developing. The jury’s political role was once more gaining importance.
A Missouri case decided the year before prompted the author of a note in the
Harvard Law Review in 1903 to complain that courts were too zealous in directing
368

See Catlett, 21 S.W. at 1062.
See, e.g., Naugatuck R.R., 24 Conn. at 478 (“Besides, this mode of trying a question
of law [nonsuit], had always been practised at the common law, and was familiarly known to
the men who framed our constitution; and it is not to be believed, that they meant, by this
clause in the constitution [‘the trial by jury shall remain inviolate’], to restrict the courts and
the legislature itself, in relation to this ancient practice.”).
370
See, e.g., Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1871); Pleasants v. Fant,
89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116 (1874); Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879).
371
See Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 501.
372
See, e.g., Pleasants, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 122.
373
Thoe v. Chi., Minneapolis & St. Paul Ry., 195 N.W. 407, 411 (Wis. 1923).
374
See Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 501.
375
See, e.g., 92 N. AM. REV. 297, 308–09 (1861) (reviewing WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY
OF TRIAL BY JURY (London, John W. Parker & Son, West Strand 1752)); Limited Sovereignty
in the United States, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1879, at 184, 185–89.
376
See generally, e.g., J. L. Thorndike, Trial by Jury in United States Courts, 26 HARV.
L. REV. 732 (1913); Ezra Ripley Thayer, Judicial Administration, 63 U. PA. L. REV. 585
(1915); Robert L. Pierce, Comment, Practice and Procedure—Reservation of Decision on
Motion for Directed Verdict as Means of Avoiding Unnecessary New Trials, 34 MICH. L.
REV. 93 (1935) [hereinafter Pierce, Practice and Procedure].
369
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verdicts.377 The author suggested that aggressive use of this procedure violated constitutional rights to jury trial: “This constitutional safeguard is of little substantial value
if the jury is not to pass upon the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the
witnesses.”378 The author specifically questioned the constitutionality of the widespread standard of directing a verdict if the court would order a new trial if the jury
reached a contrary result.379 In 1910, a Virginia lawyer harshly criticized the attempt
by certain trial judges to introduce directed verdict into that state and declared the procedure to be unconstitutional.380 The Virginian hinted at certain reasons behind his
vehement disapproval: The errant trial judges had only indulged this innovation “in
damage suits on motions made by defendant corporations.”381 These judges were biased in favor of corporations, he suggested.382 The jury was needed to correct judicial
partiality. The jury still had a political role to play.
377

Note, Limitations on Power of Court to Direct Verdict, 16 HARV. L. REV. 515, 515
(1903) [hereinafter Note, Limitations]. The case was Weltmer v. Bishop, 71 S.W. 167 (Mo.
1902), a defamation case in which the Missouri Supreme Court held that a verdict should
have been directed for the defendant, who had written that certain self-described “magnetic
healers” were frauds. Id. at 169. At trial, the magnetic healers had produced numerous witnesses testifying to the efficacy of their cure, and a jury brought in a verdict for plaintiffs. Id.
at 168. In reversing the judgment, the Missouri Supreme Court declared:
Courts are not such slaves to the forms of procedure as to surrender their
own intelligence to an array of witnesses testifying to an impossibility.
They are not required to give credence to a statement that would falsify
well-known laws of nature, though a cloud of witnesses swear to it.
Id. at 169. The U.S. Supreme Court also addressed the issue of whether these magnetic healers
were frauds, but that court overruled a trial court’s sustaining a demurrer against them. Am.
Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). The Supreme Court based its
decision on the standard of proof, skepticism about whether the fact of inefficacy could be
known in such a case, and probably confidence in the ultimate fact-finder (a federal judge
sitting in equity as opposed to a jury). Id. at 96, 101, 111.
378
Note, Limitations, supra note 377, at 515.
379
When a new trial is granted, it may be said that there is no denial of this
right, for there is another jury trial. The same, however, cannot be urged
in favor of directing a verdict . . . . Furthermore, though the practice of
granting new trials may be supported on the ground that it existed at the
time the constitutional provisions were adopted, the present practice of
directing verdicts, having grown up in the last half-century, cannot be
regarded as impliedly recognized by the constitutions.
Id.
380
M. J. Fulton, Directing Verdicts, 16 VA. L. REG. 241, 242 (1910). The practice of
directing verdicts was “not only a dangerous departure from our well known rules of procedure,” and “unnecessary, unwise and inexpedient,” but also “an inexcusable and unwarranted
usurpation of the functions of the jury by the judge, and a clear violation of our laws and
constitution.” Id. at 251.
381
Id. at 249.
382
Id.
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In 1914, Washington lawyer Frank W. Hackett383 in the Yale Law Journal made
the first extended argument that directed verdict as used in the federal courts violated
the Seventh Amendment.384 Hackett’s article was based on a petition for certiorari he
had filed in the U.S. Supreme Court the year before, in a case in which he represented
an employee suing a car manufacturing company for negligence in causing injury.385
In that case, the federal district judge had directed a verdict for the defendant because
of insufficiency of the evidence, which the Third Circuit had upheld.386 In his article
and petition for certiorari, Hackett argued for use of a strict originalist test based on the
common law of England in 1791.387 Under this standard, the only way a federal trial
court could make a final determination on sufficiency of the evidence was on a demurrer to evidence, with all its common law rigor and risks to the demurring party.388
Otherwise, a federal trial court could only grant a new trial.389
The most interesting part of Hackett’s argument was his extended discussion of
modern appellate practice in the federal courts as violating the Re-examination
Clause.390 Hackett raised important questions about the way that ancillary procedures
affected the civil jury right.391 He was virtually the only writer who perceived that
changes in appellate practice had significant implications under the Re-examination
Clause. Hackett emphasized the contemporary practice of certifying the whole evidence in the case to the appellate court for a decision on the sufficiency of the
383

Hackett was a Republican from New Hampshire who, after serving as private secretary
to Caleb Cushing, senior counsel to the Geneva Arbitration Commission in 1872, opened a
law practice in Washington, D.C. He served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1900
to 1901 under William McKinley. HENRY HARRISON METCALF & FRANCES M. ABBOTT, ONE
THOUSAND NEW HAMPSHIRE NOTABLES: BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF NEW HAMPSHIRE MEN AND WOMEN, NATIVE OR RESIDENT, PROMINENT IN PUBLIC, PROFESSIONAL,
BUSINESS, EDUCATIONAL, FRATERNAL OR BENEVOLENT WORK 451 (1919).
384
See generally Frank Warren Hackett, Has a Trial Judge of a United States Court the
Right to Direct a Verdict, 24 YALE L.J. 127 (1914).
385
Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, Allegar v. Am. Car & Foundry Co., 231 U.S.
747 (1913) (No. 705) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari]. The plaintiff
alleged negligence against the company because his fellow employees had taken him to the
company’s emergency hospital and then to another, where he claimed to have been negligently
treated by the company’s doctor, rather than home to be treated by his own doctor as he had
requested. Id. at 3–6.
386
Allegar v. Am. Car & Foundry Co., 206 F. 437, 438–40 (3d Cir. 1913). Judge George
Gray, a Democrat who had served as Delaware Attorney General and U.S. Senator from
Delaware, dissented without opinion. Id. at 440.
387
See Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 385, at 8–9, 12.
388
See Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 385, at 13–16, 31–34;
Hackett, supra note 384, at 134–35.
389
See Hackett, supra note 384, at 137; see also Note, Limitations, supra note 377, at 515.
390
See Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 385, at 10–13; Hackett, supra
note 384, at 133.
391
See Hackett, supra note 384, at 130–33, 137.
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evidence.392 At the time Hackett wrote, the whole evidence could include an official
trial transcript.393 In some jurisdictions, a system of official stenographers was in
place.394 Hackett observed that the practice of certifying the whole evidence in the
case to the full court was unknown to the common law in 1791.395 At common law,
a bill of exceptions described a particular ruling by a trial judge and some related
evidence, but not the whole evidence in the case.396 Hackett argued that examination
of the whole evidence for its sufficiency “was just what the amendment was intended
to forbid.”397 He believed that appellate review under the Seventh Amendment was
limited to the precise mechanisms for relating the evidence that had been used in
England in 1791.398 Federal appellate courts therefore had no power to review decisions by trial courts to direct verdicts based on sufficiency of the evidence.
Hackett admitted that his argument “appears to be a bold assumption,”399 and
counsel for the respondent heartily agreed.400 Counsel for respondent cited the numerous Supreme Court opinions upholding and encouraging directed verdicts.401 They
declared that the Re-examination Clause was not applicable in directed verdict cases
because the jury had found no fact.402 Hackett’s argument was not, however, that of a
lonely crank. At least one justice of the U.S. Supreme Court had earlier made an argument similar to Hackett’s. In a case before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1887, Justice
Stanley Matthews, on a motion for new trial, questioned in dicta whether the practice
of bringing up the whole evidence for appellate review of sufficiency was consistent
with the Seventh Amendment.403 Predictably, however, the U.S. Supreme Court denied
Hackett’s petition for certiorari.404 The Court apparently had no desire to demolish the
elaborate edifice of jury control it had carefully built up over the preceding half-century.
392

See Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 385, at 10–13; Hackett, supra
note 384, at 133.
393
See Lerner, The Silent Judge, supra note 18, at 263 & n.343.
394
See, e.g., Act of May 1, 1907, 1907 Pa. Laws 135 (providing for the appointment of
official stenographers in Pennsylvania).
395
See Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 385, at 10–12; Hackett, supra
note 384, at 133.
396
See Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 385, at 11–13; Hackett, supra
note 384, at 132–34.
397
See Hackett, supra note 384, at 133.
398
Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 385, at 12; Hackett, supra note
384, at 134.
399
See Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 385, at 4.
400
Brief of Respondent on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Allegar v. Am. Car &
Foundry Co., 231 U.S. 747 (1913) (No. 705) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent on Petition for
Writ of Certiorari].
401
Id. at 2–4.
402
Id. at 4–8.
403
Metro. R. Co. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 573 (1887).
404
Allegar v. Am. Car & Foundry Co., 206 F. 437 (3d Cir. 1913), cert. denied, 231 U.S.
747 (1913).
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III. A CAUTIONARY TALE: AN ATTEMPT TO APPLY A STRICT ORIGINALIST TEST
Hackett’s unusual argument—especially his reliance on a strict originalist test
under the Re-examination Clause—bears signs of the powerful influence of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.,405 decided just
months before.406 Slocum was part of a long line of cases by the U.S. Supreme Court
attempting to apply a strict originalist test under the Re-examination Clause. This line
of cases was a striking exception to the usual flexible interpretation of constitutional
rights to civil jury trial.407 The eventual fate of this test is instructive concerning the
durability of procedural rights.
Slocum concerned the constitutionality of judgment notwithstanding the verdict.408
This procedure presumably would have been more vulnerable to constitutional challenges than directed verdict. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict was a creature of
statute, which the courts had not previously developed (for the most part), and was
clearly contrary to the traditional common law practice.409 Nevertheless, there were
very few constitutional challenges to the procedure of judgment notwithstanding the
verdict based on the evidence. State courts briefly announced that the procedure was
compatible with rights to jury trial.410 Because directed verdict was constitutional,
courts held, there was no reason why the legislature could not authorize a court to
enter a judgment after a jury verdict when it should have directed one earlier.411 Courts
405

228 U.S. 364 (1913).
Hackett extensively quoted from Justice Van Devanter’s opinion in Slocum in his brief.
See Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 385, at 30–31. Counsel for respondent
claimed: “It is apparent that the present position of Counsel for the petitioner grows out of
his mis-construction of the decision of this Court in the case of Slocum v. Life Insurance Co.”
Brief of Respondent on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 400, at 6.
407
See, e.g., Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416 (Pa. 1806); Beers v. Beers, 4 Conn. 535, 538–
39; Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194 (1848).
408
See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 365, 369.
409
See Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 516–17.
410
Minnesota’s pioneer statute, enacted in 1895, drew a challenge from a plaintiff in a personal injury suit against a railroad. Kernan v. St. Paul City Ry., 67 N.W. 71, 72 (Minn. 1896)
(citing Minnesota Laws of 1895, ch. 320, 1895 Minn. Laws 729). The plaintiff had won a verdict from a jury, but the trial court entered judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict.
Id. at 71. In 1896, the Minnesota Supreme Court tersely rejected the constitutional challenge.
Id. at 72. The court held that because the defendant had not properly made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict before the trial court, the judgment in its favor had to be
reversed and a new trial granted. Id.; see also Dalmas v. Kemble, 64 A. 559, 559 (Pa. 1906)
(explicating Act of Apr. 22, 1905, 1905 Pa. Laws 286).
411
See Kernan, 67 N.W. at 72; Dalmas, 64 A. at 560 (“What the judge may do is still the
same in substance, but the time when he may do it is enlarged so as to allow deliberate
review and consideration of the facts and the law upon the whole evidence. . . . [T]here is no
intent in the act to disturb the settled line of distinction between the provinces of the court
and the jury.”).
406
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did not bother to discuss in detail the text or history of particular constitutional provisions or to look into the practice at the time these provisions were adopted.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
in 1913, was therefore a shock to many in the legal profession.412 Statutes authorizing judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the evidence had been spreading
steadily, without state constitutional impediment.413 Judges and lawyers had applauded
the development as a significant gain in efficiency without disturbing the line between
judge and jury.414 The U.S. Supreme Court had long approved of, and in fact had led
the way in, enhanced judicial control over juries through directed verdict.415 The Court
had never suggested that this greater power over juries violated the Seventh Amendment. Then, in Slocum, the Court held that a federal court could not, consistent with
the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the evidence.416
This result should not have been a surprise, considering the Court’s Re-examination Clause decisions. Many state courts and commentators had forgotten about
the independent significance of that Clause, however, and the unusual jurisprudence
interpreting it. Language similar to the first clause of the Seventh Amendment, the
Preservation Clause, was ubiquitous in state constitutions. The second clause, the Reexamination Clause, was unique to the Federal Constitution. Not only was the language of the Re-examination Clause unique, the Supreme Court, unlike any court
interpreting a preservation clause, had consistently used a strict originalist test to interpret it. The Supreme Court had long looked to the common law of England to decide
questions under the Re-examination Clause, following Justice Story.417 In discussions
of the Re-examination Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court throughout the nineteenth
century consistently quoted and applied Story’s analysis in Parsons v. Bedford:
The only modes known to the common law to re-examine such
facts [found by a jury], are the granting of a new trial by the court
where the issue was tried, or to which the record was properly
returnable; or the award of a venire facias de novo [new trial],

412

See, e.g., Pierce, Practice and Procedure, supra note 376, at 96 (“This decision [Slocum]
came as a distinct surprise.”).
413
See Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 517 & n.488.
414
See, e.g., Dalmas, 64 A. at 560 (“[T]here is no intent in the act to disturb the settled line
of distinction between the provinces of the court and the jury.”).
415
Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 117, at 488–89.
416
See Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 398–400 (1913).
417
See United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750);
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447–48 (1830); see also supra text accompanying
notes 102–04. In nineteenth-century Supreme Court jurisprudence, Parsons was the case consistently cited in discussions of the Re-examination Clause; Wonson is hardly mentioned.
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by an appellate court, for some error of law which intervened in
the proceedings.418
State judges and legal commentators should have remembered Joseph Story’s words
in Parsons v. Bedford concerning the Seventh Amendment: “But the other clause of
the amendment [the Re-examination Clause] is still more important; and we read it as
a substantial and independent clause.”419
Modern scholars have also viewed the result in Slocum as an aberration. Two
scholars, in an otherwise excellent article, called Slocum a “diversion” from the U.S.
Supreme Court’s usual support for increased control over jury verdicts, and found the
decision difficult to explain.420 As with earlier commentators, these scholars did not
recognize the independent importance of the Re-examination Clause, or the consistency of the U.S. Supreme Court’s applications of it. In general, modern scholarship
on the Seventh Amendment has not focused on the history of the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Re-examination Clause, nor indeed much on the Clause at all.421
And yet, the Re-examination Clause, not the Preservation Clause, gave rise to the strict
originalist test that has provoked so many questions.
Lillian Slocum sued New York Life to recover on a life insurance policy for her
husband, who had died four days after the grace period for the last payment on the premium had expired.422 The case was tried in the federal district court in Pennsylvania, sitting in diversity jurisdiction and following Pennsylvania practice under the Conformity
Act.423 The district court denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, and the
jury brought in a verdict for Mrs. Slocum.424 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant and applied the
418

Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 448. The Court quoted this language steadily in later cases.
See Barreda v. Silsbee, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 146, 166 (1858); Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 274, 277–78 (1869); Miller v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 285, 300
(1870); Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Comstock, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 258, 269 (1872); Mercantile
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 237, 248–49 (1873); City of Lincoln v. Power, 151
U.S. 436, 438 (1894); Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 246 (1897);
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 9 (1899).
419
Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 447.
420
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 24, at 643–45.
421
Suja Thomas has applied the Court’s traditional historical test under the Re-examination
Clause to the procedure of remittitur. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional,
supra note 15, at 164–65. For another consideration of the Clause, see Patrick Woolley, Mass
Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1998).
422
Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 370 (1913). An insurance agent had apparently agreed to a partial payment and postponement of signing a new payment plan, but the
Court held that the written insurance contract precluded such an agreement with the insurance
agent. Id. at 370–71, 374–75.
423
See id. at 366; see also 1905 Pa. Laws 286.
424
Slocum, 228 U.S. at 369.

2014] FAILURE OF ORIGINALISM IN PRESERVING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

873

Pennsylvania statute in entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict.425 The U.S.
Supreme Court, per Justice Van Devanter, agreed that the district court had clearly
erred in denying the defendant’s motion for directed verdict.426 Directing a verdict
did not implicate the Re-examination Clause, as the jury had not found any fact.427 The
Court in Slocum emphasized that the federal practice of directed verdict, although
powerful, was fully consistent with the Seventh Amendment.428 Nevertheless, the
Court held that the Re-examination Clause prevented application of the Pennsylvania
statute.429 The jury necessarily had found facts in giving a verdict, and entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict meant a judicial re-examination of those facts.430 The
Court in Slocum acknowledged the common-law procedures of judgment non obstante
veredicto and motion to arrest judgment, but it explained that these were both based
on the pleadings, not on the evidence at trial as in Slocum.431 The only possible remedy for an erroneous jury verdict in federal courts was a new trial.432 The insurance
company would have to go through another jury trial, at the end of which presumably
the judge would direct a verdict in its favor, unless Mrs. Slocum dropped or settled
her claim.
Probably to try to mitigate the apparent wastefulness of this outcome, the Court
suggested another possibility. The Court observed that, at common law, the procedure
of requiring a new trial to correct error “was regarded as of real value” because, in
addition to recognizing the right to a jury determination, it allowed a party an opportunity to produce more evidence to help rightly resolve the issue.433 Mrs. Slocum “is
entitled to that opportunity.”434 For all the Court could tell, she might be able to supply
omissions in her evidence, or show inaccuracies in the defendant’s, that would rightly
entitle her to a verdict and judgment in her favor.435
Considering the strong principle and consistency of U.S. Supreme Court Reexamination Clause decisions, the surprise is not that the Court held as it did in
Slocum, but that four justices dissented, and dissented so vigorously.436 Commentators praised the “trenchant and excellent”437 dissent of Charles Evans Hughes (then
an Associate Justice), joined by Justices Holmes, Lurton, and Pitney. Hughes was no
admirer of jury trial. In 1928, The New York Times quoted Hughes’s speech to the
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437

See id.
See id. at 375.
See id. at 376.
Id. at 369.
See id. at 376–78.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 381–82.
Id. at 398–99.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Id. at 380–81.
See id. at 400.
See, e.g., Pierce, Practice and Procedure, supra note 376, at 95.
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Federal Bar Association in New York: “Get rid of jury trials as much as possible. . . .
The ideal of justice is incarnated in the judge.”438 According to Hughes in his dissent
in Slocum, there was no re-examination of any fact tried to a jury: “But, wherein has
any matter of fact tried by a jury been reexamined? Concededly, there was no fact to
be tried by a jury; the case as made was barren of any such fact; and there being none,
there has been no re-examination of it.”439 Hughes pointed out that the federal trial
court in Pennsylvania had developed a practice of applying the Pennsylvania statute,
a practice approved by the Third Circuit.440 He warned of the “serious and far-reaching
consequences of this decision.”441 Not only did the decision prevent federal trial courts
from applying salutary state statutes like the Pennsylvania law, “but it erects an impassable barrier—unless the Constitution be amended—to action by Congress along
the same line for the purpose of remedying the mischief of repeated trials and of thus
diminishing in a highly important degree the delays and expense of litigation.”442 At
a time of great docket pressure, Justice Hughes was not impressed with the value of
giving Mrs. Slocum or any other such litigant another “opportunity” at jury trial. In
Hughes’s view, the practical needs of the legal system trumped adherence to a strict
historical test, however longstanding or consistently applied.
Like Justice Hughes, the legal profession reacted strongly against the decision
in Slocum.443 To some extent, state judges and legal commentators simply failed to
438

Fewer Jury Trials Urged by Hughes: More Power for the Federal Judges Would
Improve System, He Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1928, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
439
Slocum, 228 U.S. at 401 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
440
See, e.g., Fries-Breslin Co. v. Bergen, 176 F. 76 (3d Cir. 1909); Smith v. Jones, 181
F. 819 (3d Cir. 1910). For a later opinion in which Chief Justice Hughes disapproved of a
federal court applying a state law concerning judge-jury relations under the Conformity Act,
see Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931).
441
Slocum, 228 U.S. at 400.
442
Id.
443
See, e.g., Constitutional Law—Practice in the Federal Courts—Motion Non Obstante
Veredicto, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 544, 545 (1913) (“The decision, certainly, is to be regretted
in the face of the present movement for fewer trials and less expensive litigation.”); Jury
Trial—Re-examination of Facts Tried by Jury—The Slocum Case, 47 AM. L. REV. 906, 907
(1913) [hereinafter Re-examination of Facts Tried by Jury] (“It is certainly to be regretted
that the majority of the Supreme Court should have felt constrained to construe this amendment
with strictness.”); Thorndike, supra note 376, at 737 (“The decision of the majority of the
court is a public misfortune.”); Arthur W. Spencer, Superfluous New Trials and the Seventh
Amendment, 26 GREEN BAG 106, 106 (1914) (“The decision in [Slocum] has provoked much
adverse comment in the legal press.”); Thayer, supra note 376, at 587.
The decision in Slocum caused consternation at the American Bar Association’s annual
meeting in September 1913. A special committee of the ABA had proposed a statute to reduce
new trials that might be construed as unconstitutional following Slocum. See Report of the
Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws, in REPORT OF THE
THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION HELD AT MONTREAL,
CANADA 561, 562–68 (1913); id. at 565–66 (“There is no divine right to have the rules of
evidence, or of procedure, always remain the same.”).
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understand the independent significance of the Re-examination Clause and the jurisprudence under it. An example of such a failure—and of the difference the absence of the
Re-examination Clause made in state cases—was an opinion of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts a few months after Slocum. Bothwell v. Boston Elevated
Railway Co.444 was a case of wrongful death brought by the family of a boy who had
been run over by a street car, with an unusual twist.445 In Bothwell, the trial court
denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The jury gave a verdict for the
plaintiff.446 The Supreme Judicial Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Arthur Rugg,
held that a verdict should have been directed for the defendant.447 As the case was
“fully and fairly tried,”448 the Court decided to exercise its power under a Massachusetts
statute of 1909 to enter judgment for the defendant, notwithstanding the verdict.449
The Supreme Judicial Court stated that it would have done so without discussion,
were it not for the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Slocum.450 Massachusetts courts
had entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict under the statute “in numerous instances without question of its validity.”451 The Supreme Judicial Court observed that
Slocum was not a binding authority for it, and that the Seventh Amendment did not
apply to the states.452 Even so, “deference” was due to the reasoning of a decision by
An exception to this almost universal criticism was a long article, spread out over several issues of the Illinois Law Review, by Henry Schofield of Northwestern University Law
School, arguing that the decision was correct. See Henry Schofield, New Trials and the
Seventh Amendment: Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 8 ILL. L. REV. 287 (1913); id.
at 381; id. at 365.
444
102 N.E. 665 (Mass. 1913).
445
In Bothwell, the plaintiff’s nine-year-old son was with a group of other boys standing
on a sidewalk looking at a Chinese man who was fixing something on the floor of a shop
with a hatchet. “The boys were ‘teasing’ or ‘mocking’ [the court was quoting the record] the
Chinaman, who, after a few minutes, ‘got up with the hatchet in the air and walked toward
the door.’” Bothwell, 102 N.E. at 666 (citation omitted). The boys then scattered in different
directions, and the plaintiff’s son ran into the street in front of a street car and was killed. Id.
A Massachusetts statute authorized a wrongful death action against a street car company if the
decedent was “in the exercise of due care.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 392, § 1 (1907). The plaintiff
argued that the boy was excused from the requirement of acting with due care because he was
afraid of the Chinese man. Bothwell, 102 N.E. at 666.
446
Bothwell, 102 N.E. at 666.
447
Id. The Supreme Judicial Court explained that fear could indeed excuse a person from
acting with due care, as long as the person was free from blame in the event which caused the
fright. Id. In this case, the court stated, the boy was blameworthy in teasing the Chinese man
and therefore was not excused from the requirement of due care. Id. (“The plaintiff’s intestate
was engaged with his companions in the wrongful project of ‘teasing’ and ‘mocking’ a
Chinaman at work on his own premises. It might reasonably have been anticipated that in
some way he would attempt to be rid of his tormentors.”).
448
Id.
449
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 236, § 1 (1909).
450
Bothwell, 102 N.E. at 667.
451
Id.
452
Id.
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the nation’s highest court.453 The Massachusetts court thought Slocum’s reasoning
called into question the validity of the Massachusetts statute, because the Massachusetts
constitution, like the federal, contained a right to jury trial.454 The Massachusetts court
failed to recognize the independent importance of the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause. The Massachusetts court announced that it was following the
usual originalist test,455 but upheld the new procedure with reasoning similar to that of
the other state courts that had addressed the issue.456 The court emphasized that its interpretation of the right of civil jury trial allowed “slightly more flexibility in its adaptation of details to the changing needs of society without in any degree impairing its
essential character” than the U.S. Supreme Court had allowed in Slocum.457 Legal
commentators praised the decision in Bothwell.458
In the federal courts, thanks to the Re-examination Clause and the decision in
Slocum, the issue was still alive. Commentators soon assailed the decision in Slocum.459
They also immediately suggested a way around it. A special committee of the American
Bar Association drafted federal legislation that provided for a federal trial judge in
a civil case to submit to a jury the general issue, and also specific issues of fact, and
to reserve “any question of law arising in the case for subsequent argument and decision.”460 Either the trial judge or an appellate court could direct judgment to be entered based on the court’s decision on the law.461 In May 1913, less than two weeks
after the Slocum decision, Elihu Root introduced the bill in the U.S. Senate.462 Several
legal commentators suggested that this procedure of the trial judge reserving a question of law, and taking a verdict from a jury subject to the later decision of the trial
or appellate court, would solve the constitutional problem posed by Slocum.463 This
procedure, commentators explained, resembled the English case reserved, which was
clearly a feature of common law practice in 1791.464
453

Id.
Id.
455
Id. at 669.
456
Id. (“The statute simply permits that to be done by this court which ought to have been
done at the trial.”).
457
Id.
458
See, e.g., Latest Important Cases: Appellate Procedure—Trial by Jury—Massachusetts
Constitution Does Not Guarantee Right to a Second Jury Trial of the Same Controversy, 25
GREEN BAG 482, 482 (1913) (quoting Editorial, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 7, 1913)).
459
See supra note 443.
460
Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws,
in REPORT OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
HELD AT MONTREAL, CANADA 571 (1913).
461
Id.
462
Id. at 570.
463
See Thorndike, supra note 376, at 737; Re-examination of Facts Tried by Jury, supra
note 443, at 907–10; Spencer, supra note 443, at 112–13; Thayer, supra note 376, at 600–01.
464
See Thorndike, supra note 376, at 737; Re-examination of Facts Tried by Jury, supra
note 443, at 908; Spencer, supra note 443, at 112; Thayer, supra note 376, at 599.
454
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Although the ABA bill that Root introduced in the U.S. Senate did not become
law, some state legislatures enacted similar provisions allowing a state trial court to
take a jury verdict subject to a later decision on the law. In 1935, the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of just such a statute. In Baltimore & Carolina
Line, Inc. v. Redman,465 the plaintiff sued a railroad for personal injuries in federal court
in New York. At the close of evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict for
insufficient evidence.466 The trial court, applying a New York statute,467 reserved decision on the motion and submitted the case to the jury subject to the court’s opinion
on the question reserved.468 The jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff.469 The trial
court held the evidence was sufficient and entered judgment for the plaintiff.470 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the evidence was insufficient and ordered
a new trial.471 The Court of Appeals decided it could not apply the New York statute
and enter judgment for the defendant because of the Slocum decision.472
This time, Justice Van Devanter wrote for a unanimous court, and his opinion was
considerably shorter. Van Devanter explained that the situation in Redman was “very
different” from that in Slocum, because the trial court in Redman had taken a verdict
from a jury that was expressly subject to the court’s decision on a question of law.473
This practice, the Court stated, was in accord with the English common law practice of
reserving questions of law, in use at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted.474
465

295 U.S. 654 (1935).
Id. at 656.
467
1920 N.Y. Laws 165, §§ 459, 461.
468
Redman, 295 U.S. at 656.
469
Id.
470
Id.
471
Id.
472
Id.
473
Id. at 658–59.
474
At common law there was a well established practice of reserving
questions of law arising during trials by jury and of taking verdicts
subject to the ultimate ruling on the questions reserved; and under this
practice the reservation carried with it authority to make such ultimate
disposition of the case as might be made essential by the ruling under
the reservation, such as non-suiting the plaintiff where he had obtained
a verdict, entering a verdict or judgment for one party where the jury had
given a verdict to the other, or making other essential adjustments.
Fragmentary references to the origin and basis of the practice indicate
that it came to be supported on the theory that it gave better opportunity
for considered rulings, made new trials less frequent, and commanded
such general approval that parties litigant assented to its application as
a matter of course. But whatever may have been its origin or theoretical
basis, it undoubtedly was well established when the Seventh Amendment
was adopted, and therefore must be regarded as a part of the commonlaw rules to which resort must be had in testing and measuring the right
of trial by jury as preserved and protected by that Amendment.
Id. at 659–60.
466
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(The practice in England was known as the “case stated,” and James Oldham has shown
that Mansfield used it even in cases in which there were factual disputes.475 ) In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court had previously recognized that federal courts could take
a verdict subject to the court’s opinion on a question of law.476 Application of the New
York statute was therefore constitutional in a federal court.477 The Court ordered a
judgment of dismissal on the merits, which was to be the equivalent of a judgment
for the defendant on a directed verdict.478 Despite the rigorous requirements of the Reexamination Clause, the federal courts could, after all, order judgment notwithstanding
the verdict if the proper procedure was followed. The decisions in Slocum and Redman
could be viewed as wholly compatible. Commentators immediately hailed the result
in Redman for permitting “a reduction in the number of costly and stultifying retrials
of jury cases.”479
The result in Redman ought to give the supporters of a strict originalist test for jury
rights pause. Even the strict originalist test the Supreme Court applied consistently
under the Re-examination Clause did not prevent a significant change in practice.
Through a clever procedural mechanism, the requirements of the Re-examination
Clause could be evaded. The current provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
on the subject, Rule 50(b), states: “If the court does not grant a motion for judgment
as a matter of law made [before the case is submitted to the jury], the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court’s later deciding
the legal questions raised by the motion.”480 Reservation of the question has become
automatic, a skillful solution to the problem posed by the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
John Langbein wrote that we are used to seeing the Bill of Rights as a success
story.481 He remarked, however, on a “spectacular failure”: criminal jury trial.482
475

OLDHAM, supra note 25, at 10–13.
In one such case, in 1830, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a judgment entered for
plaintiff on a jury verdict and entered judgment for the defendant. Chinoweth v. Haskell’s
Lessee, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 92, 98 (1830). In 1927, the Court applied a Massachusetts statute
permitting alternative jury verdicts, which a court could choose between depending on its decision on law. N. Ry. Co. v. Page, 274 U.S. 65, 67 (1927).
477
See Redman, 295 U.S. at 661.
478
Id.
479
Pierce, Practice and Procedure, supra note 376, at 97–98, 100. The article called the
result in Redman “obviously commendable.” Id. at 97. See also id. at 97–98; Note, Reversal
Without Retrial Under the Seventh Amendment, 21 IOWA L. REV. 117, 118, 123–25 (1935)
(criticizing the Slocum decision for its “extreme rigidity” and praising Redman).
480
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
481
John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of the
Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 119 (1992).
482
Id.
476
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Attempts to mandate civil jury trial have failed even more spectacularly. Courts, faced
with the language of preservation in constitutional jury trial rights, applied originalist
tests. These proved so flexible, however, that legislatures and courts have modified
civil jury trial almost out of existence. The alternative, a strict historical test, was considered not sufficiently adaptable to changing circumstances. As the U.S. Supreme
Court’s experience with the Re-examination Clause illustrates, even the adoption and
consistent application of a strict originalist test is no guarantee that jury practice will
remain unchanged.
Might there be a way of preserving some core or essence of a jury trial right? This
Conclusion sketches some ideas. These ideas need to be developed in a separate work,
fully engaging the large and sophisticated body of literature on originalism that is
touched on here. The usual method of interpreting constitutional rights to account for
changed circumstances is to search for functional equivalents, a process sometimes
called “translation.”483 With respect to substantive rights, we can find reasonable functional equivalents. Internet postings can be protected along with printing presses under
the First Amendment, handguns along with muskets under the Second Amendment,
telephone calls and emails along with letters under the Fourth Amendment. We can
make sensible substitutions to account for technological change. To be sure, there are
problems with deciding on the level of abstraction,484 and working out the precise
details of what is protected. Still, a core can be protected.
Procedural rights are different.485 With procedural rights, the change in question
is not simply technological, but legal. The whole legal system around a particular procedure may have changed, virtually nullifying it. Today, we hardly engage in any sort
of adjudication—jury or otherwise—to resolve civil or criminal cases.486 Settlement
or plea bargaining takes the place of adjudication.487 To truly return to a jury system
like that of the founding era would mean, at a minimum, prohibiting most pretrial
discovery and plea bargaining. Such a return would mean prohibiting many other
changes, such as those on the civil side examined in this Article. It might also, by the
way, mean restoring to trial judges a very vigorous power to comment on the evidence. Almost an entire procedural system must be preserved in order to preserve a
single procedural right like jury trial.
483

See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171–73 (1993).
See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 300
(2009); Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of
Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 600 (2008).
485
James Whitman has criticized procedural rights compared with substantive rights.
James Q. Whitman, What Happened to Tocqueville’s America?, 74 SOC. RES. 251, 263
(2007) (“Procedural protections are comparatively weak, easily evaded, and difficult to generalize beyond their point of departure. Substantive protections, by contrast, are comparatively strong.”).
486
See Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial, supra note 10, at 569.
487
Id.
484
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The fundamental difficulty is that a procedural system, in order to work effectively,
requires two characteristics: it needs to be conceived as a whole, with each part carefully considered in relation to the others, and it needs to be adjustable to meet changed
circumstances. Even Friedrich Hayek, a great champion of the spontaneous development of rules of just conduct, thought that rules of organization were different.488 He
believed that rules of organization, including the procedure and organization of the
courts, had to be designed and adjusted deliberately.489 Trying to pick out particular
procedures for preservation as constitutional rights defeats both needs. Judges and
legal commentators may continue to echo the praises heaped on the jury by their
predecessors, but it is difficult to imagine a scenario of a revived civil jury remotely
similar to that of the founding era. We would do better to search for more viable
methods of adjudication.
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1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 124–25 (1973).
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Id. at 125.

